Regulating Democratized Investing

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Robinhood and its imitators activated millions of new investors. Perhaps we should applaud them for finally resurrecting the retail investor after a decades-long decline. There are, however, reasons for concern. Robinhood racked up record fines in the run-up to its IPO. Its users are young, inexperienced, and prone to speculating in risky investments. Given these concerns, this Article considers how to protect this new class of “ultra-retail investors” while also leaving regulatory breathing room for these new market participants. It concludes that many current regulatory approaches risk being ineffectual or stamping out ultra-retail investing altogether by targeting product features that were instrumental to Robinhood’s ascent. This Article therefore proposes a new approach that better balances paternalistic notions of investor protection, on the one hand, and investor access and choice, on the other hand. Specifically, this Article proposes a regulatory safe harbor for small accounts. Instead of trying to make investing safe, or excluding investors from investments deemed unsafe, the proposal maximizes investor choice and access within limits.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2013, Robinhood set out to “democratize” stock trading by developing an app that targeted neophyte investors wagering relatively small amounts.\(^1\) By the time the company filed for its initial public offering (“IPO”) in 2021, it reported substantial progress towards that goal. According to the IPO prospectus, Robinhood hosts 18 million funded accounts.\(^2\) Over 50% of its customers are first-time investors.\(^3\) By the company’s estimates, it was responsible for nearly 50% of all new brokerage accounts opened across all brokerages from 2016 to 2021.\(^4\) In short, Robinhood and its imitators activated a new substrata of retail investor, referred to below as “ultra-retail investors.”\(^5\)

In a sense, Robinhood’s business success is the realization of an elusive policy goal. Throughout most of the postwar period, direct stock ownership by retail investors, as compared to institutional investors, steadily declined.\(^6\) At the

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\(^1\) See Robinhood Markets, Inc., Prospectus (Form 424B4), at 1 (July 28, 2021) [hereinafter Robinhood Prospectus].

\(^2\) See id. at 2.

\(^3\) See id.

\(^4\) See id.


\(^6\) See Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal Securities Regulation in the New Millennium, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 339, 350–51 (2008) (“Retail investors are simply no longer the mainstay of the public markets and are unlikely to return to this position.”); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (2009) (“That the market for corporate securities traded on the New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ Global Market is no longer substantially retail in nature is now common knowledge.”). A paper by Marshall E. Blume and Donald B. Keim details the trend:

[\(^\text{[F]rom 1900 to 1945, the proportion of equities managed by institutional investors hovered around 5%. After World War II, however, institutional ownership started to}\

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same time, a substantial amount of investing activity moved to private markets from which retail investors are excluded as a practical and regulatory matter. Regulators and academics grappled with the consequences of this trend. Some commentators emphasized inequities, noting that retail investors increasingly lacked access to the same investing opportunities as wealthier investors. Others expressed concern that without regulatory interventions to boost investor confidence dwindling retail participation would sap public equities markets of their vitality. The securities industry launched a broad-based marketing campaign to reverse the trend and promote “mass shareownership.” Against this backdrop, perhaps we should applaud a plucky startup for finally resurrecting the retail investor.

increase, and by 1980, institutions held $473 billion, or 34%, of the total market value of U.S. common stocks. By 2010, institutions held $11.5 trillion, or 67% of all stocks.

Knowledge at Wharton Staff, Growth in Institutional Investing: A Role in Market Liquidity?, KNOWLEDGE AT WHARTON (Nov. 5, 2012). Although the percentage of the stock market owned by retail investors has declined, retail investors do own more stock in absolute terms than they did in prior decades. See Langevoort, supra, at 1026 n.4. And retail investors own shares indirectly through managed funds. See id. at 1030.

See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 6, at 344 (discussing “the emergence of a private, or ‘shadow,’ securities market in the United States” for institutional investors); Brian G. Cartwright, Gen. Couns., SEC, Speech by SEC Staff: The Future of Securities Regulation (Oct. 24, 2007), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/growth-in-institutional-investing-a-role-in-market-liquidity/ [https://perma.cc/J9VL-NAM7]. Although the percentage of the stock market owned by retail investors has declined, retail investors do own more stock in absolute terms than they did in prior decades. See Langevoort, supra, at 1026 n.4. And retail investors own shares indirectly through managed funds. See id. at 1030.

See, e.g., Davidoff, supra note 6, at 352 (discussing how institutionalization may diminish the effectiveness of regulatory efforts); Langevoort, supra note 6, at 1026 (“There are scores of academically interesting questions raised for securities regulation by the process of institutionalization (or ‘deretailization’) . . . .”); Cartwright, supra note 7 (discussing the policy consequences of “deretailization” such as increasing concentration of ownership).

See Usha Rodrigues, Securities Law’s Dirty Little Secret, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3390–91 (2013) (“The dirty little secret of U.S. securities law is that the rich not only have more money—they also have access to types of wealth-generating investments not available, by law, to the average investor.”); Cartwright, supra note 7 (identifying as one consequence of institutionalization “the exclusion of retail investors entirely from some of the most important and dynamic new trading markets and new asset classes”).

See Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 430 (2002) (“Rather than dismiss the ‘unsophisticated investor’ as the weak animal that must sadly but necessarily be culled out of the investing herd in order to improve the species, perhaps we should pay close attention to his care and feeding.”).

governance and advance ESG goals); Jill Fisch, \textit{GameStop and the Reemergence of the Retail Investor}, 102 B.U. L. REV. 1799, 1834, 1839, 1859 (2022) (identifying as benefits empowerment of younger and more diverse investors, giving “ordinary citizens” more voice in corporate decisions, and creating opportunities for promoting financial literacy).

13 This Article focuses primarily on protecting ultra-retail investors from suffering financial losses, rather than protecting stock markets more generally. For another perspective on how the SEC can best protect these investors, see James Fallows Tierney, \textit{Investment Games}, 72 DUKE L.J. 353, 387–90 (2022), which discusses how securities law might distinguish between trading for “rational” gambling-like reasons and trading under an incorrect belief that one has informational advantages. Moreover, while this Article focuses on protecting ultra-retail investors, other commentators discuss how ultra-retail investing might adversely affect the market (not just retail investors). See Fisch, supra note 12, at 1822 (“The GameStop frenzy has also caused commentators to worry about the broader capital market impact of retail investing. Three related concerns dominate: volatility, systemic instability, and capital allocation.”); Sue S. Guan, \textit{Meme Investors and Retail Risk}, 63 B.C. L. REV. 2051, 2056–58 (2022) (considering how coordinated retail trading might adversely affect price accuracy, allocational efficiency, liquidity, and corporate governance); and Tierney, supra, at 358–59, 430–35 (discussing effects on market volatility, price discovery, and allocational efficiency).

14 By traditional investment objectives, I mean “saving for retirement, meeting liquidity needs, harvesting tax losses, or rebalancing [a] portfolio.” See Brad M. Barber, Xing Huang, Terrance Odean & Christopher Schwarz, \textit{Attention-Induced Trading and Returns: Evidence from Robinhood Users}, 77 J. FIN. 3141, 3142 (2022).

15 Herding refers to highly correlated investing activities. While the general population of retail investors concentrates 24% of net buying in ten stocks, Robinhood investors concentrate 35% of net buying in ten stocks. \textit{Id.} at 3143. Herding episodes by Robinhood users appear to be driven by features of the Robinhood app, such as its “Top Movers List,” and are associated with abnormal negative returns. \textit{See id.} at 3141–44.

16 Speculating refers to frequent buying and selling for reasons other than conventional personal finance reasons. Robinhood investors trade more frequently than most investors. \textit{See id.} at 3142 (noting that Robinhood users trade nine times more often than E-Trade customers and forty times more often than Schwab customers).


18 As of March 31, 2021, Robinhood reported assets under custody approximately as follows: $65 billion in equities, $2 billion in options, $11.5 billion in crypto currencies. \textit{See Robinhood Prospectus, supra note 1, at 134. For a description of options trades available on Robinhood, see infra text accompanying notes 144–167.}
inexperienced,19 with sometimes tragic results such as the suicide of a young customer who misinterpreted a temporary negative account balance.20

Moreover, Robinhood has sometimes exhibited the same swashbuckling attitude towards regulatory compliance as some of its more notorious Silicon Valley neighbors.21 In the lead up to its IPO, the company racked up over $165 million in fines from the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).22

This Article examines how regulators should think about protecting ultraretail investors given Robinhood’s business successes and regulatory entanglements. It critiques current regulatory initiatives as either: (1) likely to be futile or (2) so incongruent with the ultraretail business model that they may stamp out this new class of investing altogether.23 To provide an example of the first criticism, requiring brokers to disclose more fully the risks of options trading is likely futile in a digital environment where online brokers have increasingly sophisticated understanding of user behavior and incentives to craft

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19 See Robinhood Prospectus, supra note 1, at 2 (reporting that over 50% of Robinhood customers say Robinhood was their first brokerage account); Andrew Keshner, A Burning Question to Ask Before Buying Robinhood IPO Stock—Will Users ‘Age Out’ of the App?, MARKETWATCH, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/a-burning-question-to-ask-before-buying-robinhood-ipo-stock-will-users-age-out-of-the-app-11627567521?mod=search_headline [https://perma.cc/4863-GSEM] (July 31, 2021) (reporting that the average age of a Robinhood user is thirty-one, compared to forty-nine for Schwab).


23 See infra Part V.A (critiquing current regulatory approaches).
intentionally ineffective disclosure.\textsuperscript{24} To provide an example of the second criticism, characterizing especially engaging features of Robinhood’s app as investment “recommendations,” thereby triggering onerous suitability duties to customers, might stamp out ultra-retail investing altogether by effectively prohibiting key product features.\textsuperscript{25}

Accordingly, I propose looking to other regulatory regimes—those governing “crowdfunding” in particular—for models that more effectively protect ultra-retail investors from severe harm while still leaving room for these investors in securities markets. Much as recent crowdfunding regulations try to contain the damage of failed crowdfunding investments through annual investment caps,\textsuperscript{26} the proposal would try to protect ultra-retail investors from large losses through limiting the sizes of their brokerage accounts. Specifically, the proposal would deem small accounts (but only small accounts) as compliant with forms of broker regulation that might otherwise threaten the viability of ultra-retail investing, such as broad-ranging suitability obligations.\textsuperscript{27} This regulatory safe harbor would promote investor choice and access, but only within clear limits.

The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part II describes efforts by policy makers and the securities industry to promote retail investing. Part III explains Robinhood’s success in finally resurrecting retail investing by examining the company’s pricing model, marketing, and user experience design. Part IV describes existing regulatory efforts aimed at Robinhood and ultra-retail investing. Part V critiques current regulatory initiatives and outlines this Article’s proposal.

II. PROMOTING RETAIL INVESTING: AN ELUSIVE GOAL

This Part describes efforts by regulators, commentators, and the securities industry to promote retail investing. These efforts, though achieving mixed results, form an important backdrop to the current age of ultra-retail investing.

\textsuperscript{24} See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing FINRA Rule 2220’s requirement that a broker adequately explain to customers the risks of options trading); infra Part V.A.2 (arguing that FINRA Rule 2220 is likely to be ineffective in a contemporary digital environment).

\textsuperscript{25} See infra Part IV.C (describing claims by the Massachusetts regulators that Robinhood’s “100 Most Popular List” and gamification techniques constitute “recommendations” and therefore require Robinhood to determine that investments are suitable for customers in light of their financial condition and investing experience); infra Part V.A.3 (arguing that features of the app targeted by Massachusetts were instrumental to Robinhood’s ascent).

\textsuperscript{26} See infra text accompanying notes 233–235 (discussing a provision of crowdfunding regulations that limits an individual to investing no more than 10% of his or her net worth in crowdfunding offerings annually).

\textsuperscript{27} See infra Part V.B (discussing the scope and requirements of the proposed safe harbor for small brokerage accounts).
A. Retail Investing as Policy

Protection of retail investors, as distinguished from institutional investors, is a long-running theme in securities regulation. As Donald Langevoort has written:

The Securities and Exchange Commission thinks of itself as the investors’ advocate, by which it means retail investors—individuals and households—as opposed to institutional investors. To be sure, it sometimes helps the latter as well. But throughout the SEC’s history and culture, the rhetorical stress has been on the plight of average investors, ones who lack investing experience and sophistication so as to need the protection of the securities laws.28

What is less clear is precisely how or why regulators should prioritize the needs of retail investors. To answer this question, it is necessary to interrogate the meaning of “investor protection,” a phrase that is not especially well defined given its prominence in securities regulation. 29 In previous work, I identified at least three different philosophies of investor protection in existing regulations and scholarship.30 While each of these philosophies takes a somewhat different view of retail investors, they are, on the whole, cautiously supportive of special efforts to make space for retail investors in capital markets.31

The predominant notion of investor protection in U.S. securities law might be called “investor-choice protection.”32 This philosophy has somewhat libertarian undertones in that it does not try to save investors from their own unadvisable choices.33 Instead, it tries to facilitate mutually beneficial investment transactions by reducing information asymmetries and associated problems of fraud and agency costs.34 Investor-choice protection is most clearly

28 Langevoort, supra note 6, at 1025.
31 See id.
32 See id. at 2265–68 (identifying a philosophy of investor-choice protection in legal scholarship and existing regulatory structures).
33 See Guttentag, supra note 29, at 229–32 (“There is less evidence in the historical record that federal securities regulations were enacted for the purpose of protecting investors from their own unwise investment decisions than might be expected.”).
reflected in the anti-fraud and disclosure provisions in the ’33 and ’34 Acts.\textsuperscript{35} While these mechanisms do benefit retail investors, especially in public markets where information is incorporated into pricing,\textsuperscript{36} investor-choice protection is, by its nature, relatively tolerant of retail investors making bad decisions as judged by traditional investment criteria.

Other aspects of securities laws, however, reflect a palpably different philosophy we might call “paternalistic investor protection.”\textsuperscript{37} This philosophy is more willing to save retail investors from themselves by either prohibiting choices that defy conventional investment advice or actively promoting such advice.\textsuperscript{38} This philosophy sometimes emerges outside the core provisions of the ’33 and ’34 Acts.\textsuperscript{39} For example, FINRA, the securities industry’s self-regulatory organization, requires brokers to evaluate whether certain kinds of investments, such as options, are appropriate for an investor based on factors such as investment experience and financial condition.\textsuperscript{40} Paternalistic investor protection is also reflected in the SEC’s public outreach efforts such as educational initiatives that promote diversification and conventional asset allocation strategies.\textsuperscript{41}

There is a third notion of investor protection that might be called “investor-access protection.”\textsuperscript{42} According to this philosophy, a major goal of securities regulation is ensuring retail investors broad access to markets.\textsuperscript{43} Prominent examples are insider trading rules that seek to create a level playing field among all investors,\textsuperscript{44} Regulation FD’s requirements to communicate simultaneously

\textsuperscript{35} Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175, 181–82 (2010) (describing disclosure as a form of investor protection that gives investors “tools to look out for themselves”).


\textsuperscript{37} See Cable, supra note 30, at 2268–73 (identifying a philosophy of paternalistic investor protection in existing rules and regulatory initiatives).

\textsuperscript{38} See id.


\textsuperscript{40} See 2360. Options, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/fnra-rules/2360 [https://perma.cc/N43Q-3DWY]. For a discussion of these obligations, see infra text accompanying notes 173–175.

\textsuperscript{41} See Cable, supra note 30, at 2270 (discussing the SEC’s investor education efforts).

\textsuperscript{42} See id. at 2274–75 (identifying a philosophy of “populist investor protection” in legal scholarship and existing regulations). In my prior work, I referred to “populist” investor protection. Because the term populist has taken on greater meaning in political discourse, I instead use the term “access” here to avoid unintended associations.

\textsuperscript{43} See id.

\textsuperscript{44} See Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1329 (1999) (suggesting that insider trading law reflects an ideology grounded in “envy and frustration at the wealth and power of economic elites”).
with retail and institutional investors, and crowdfunding rules that try to bring startup investing to the masses. Although these regulatory efforts might sometimes be justified in terms of the SEC’s other goal of “capital formation,” they should also be understood as a version of investor protection that incorporates notions of equity and takes particular interest in the fair treatment of everyday investors.

Part V will return to these regulatory philosophies in critiquing current and proposed regulation of Robinhood. For now, the key insight is that promoting retail investing is a recognized, though challenging, policy goal. While paternalistic impulses might counsel for shielding novice investors from the consequences of their own limitations, access and choice are also important values in securities regulation and may justify special efforts to accommodate small investors.

B. Industry-Led Initiatives

One might expect that the securities industry would unequivocally embrace the cause of promoting widespread investing, but in fact stockbrokers have a complicated history with retail investors. For much of the twentieth century, the profession was insular and highly skeptical of small investors. The old guard of Wall Street firms publicly blamed inexperienced investors and their “mob psychology” for stock market instability, including the crash of 1929.

46 See Darian M. Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1481, 1486 (2017) (“Crowdfunding was also designed to democratize startup investing, so that ‘ordinary Americans’ could have a chance to own the next Facebook or Twitter before they are public (and commanding a much higher stock price).”); Andrew A. Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 661, 672 [hereinafter Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding] (“Inclusivity is foundational to securities crowdfunding. The essence of the concept is the creation of an inclusive market where ordinary investors will be able to make investments that have traditionally been the exclusive purview of wealthy and connected investors.”). For an explanation of crowdfunding regulations, see infra text accompanying notes 229–235.
47 See Cable, supra note 30, at 2263 (identifying capital formation and investor protection as the dual goals of the SEC); Stout, supra note 10, at 430 (noting that retail investor confidence allowed the United States “to develop a multi-trillion dollar public securities market”); Andrew A. Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 885, 905 (2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding] (“[T]he first policy goal of securities crowdfunding is to provide startup companies with an efficient way to raise capital from the public.”).
48 See Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, supra note 46, at 671–74 (discussing the importance of “inclusivity” in crowdfunding and other regulatory fields); Rodrigues, supra note 9, at 3390–91 (arguing that the unfair treatment of retail investors is securities law’s “dirty little secret”); Cartwright, supra note 7 (discussing “the exclusion of retail investors entirely” from certain asset classes).
49 See Traflet, supra note 11, at 258–61.
50 See id.
51 See id. at 260.
In the early decades of the twentieth century, professional norms and rules of the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), the industry’s then-current vehicle for self-regulation, restricted mass advertising by brokerages for fear that recruiting “speculative incompetents” to the market would have a destabilizing effect.\textsuperscript{52} Retail investors, still feeling the bite of the crash, often reciprocated those chilly feelings.\textsuperscript{53}

In some respects, this antagonism softened by mid-century. A new generation of brokerage firms, more focused on sales commissions than upper-crust investment banking, were more solicitous of the investing public.\textsuperscript{54} Merrill Lynch, for example, invested heavily in advertising with a goal of finding new customers and “bring[ing] Wall Street to Main Street.”\textsuperscript{55} A new generation of leadership at the NYSE initiated a wide-ranging publicity campaign to encourage mass share ownership.\textsuperscript{56} Under the slogan “Own Your Share,” the NYSE produced films, advertised, and held promotional events encouraging middle-class Americans to buy stock in support of a “people’s capitalism.”\textsuperscript{57}

Yet, more conservative elements of the profession were apprehensive about the new direction,\textsuperscript{58} and the industry’s more concrete actions sometimes belied the inclusive messaging.\textsuperscript{59} Member firms of the NYSE coordinated to set minimum commission rates, insulating brokers from the kind of competition that would eventually transform the industry.\textsuperscript{60}

When the SEC and Congress ended rate collusion in 1975,\textsuperscript{61} the regulatory shakeup ushered in a new era of competition and innovation with the rise of

\textsuperscript{52} See id. at 258–59.
\textsuperscript{53} See id. at 259–62 (discussing negative perceptions of the brokerage industry both before and after the stock market crash).
\textsuperscript{54} See id. at 261–63.
\textsuperscript{55} See Traflet, supra note 11, at 263; see also Ron Chernow, The Death of the Banker 49 (1997) (describing the ascendance of commission-oriented banking firms, such as Goldman Sachs, corresponding with an emerging class of institutional investor).
\textsuperscript{56} See Traflet, supra note 11, at 264.
\textsuperscript{57} See id. at 257, 266–67.
\textsuperscript{58} See Janice M. Traflet & Michael P. Coyne, Ending a NYSE Tradition: The 1975 Unraveling of Brokers’ Fixed Commissions and Its Long Term Impact on Financial Advertising, 25 ESSAYS ECON. & BUS. HIST. 131, 136 (2007) (“Historically, NYSE members resisted advertising their services, even when the Board, through the Own Your Share marketing campaign, encouraged them to do so.”).
\textsuperscript{59} See id. at 136–37.
\textsuperscript{61} See Traflet & Coyne, supra note 58, at 131–35.
“discount brokers” like Charles Schwab.62 These new entrants charged customers substantially lower commissions on securities transactions than their predecessors.63 These discounts were made possible in part by reduced overhead and a narrower product offering, such as cutting research and advisory services.64 In addition to slimmer offerings, discount brokerages shifted their attention to new sources of revenues. Instead of relying primarily on commissions for stock trades, discount brokers earned profits from charging interest on margin loans,65 offering proprietary mutual funds or other financial products,66 and a practice known as payment for order flow (“PFOF”) that is discussed below.

The 1990s and early 2000s witnessed one more step towards wide-spread investing. The first generation of discount brokers and upstart firms, like E-trade and Ameritrade, invested heavily in software interfaces for customers.67 Trading commissions continued to decline, in some cases to $5 per trade.68 To be clear, this first generation of discount broker did not necessarily cater to the broad swath of novice investors targeted by Robinhood. One might think of the quintessential Schwab or Ameritrade customer of the 1990s as a self-


63 See Traflet & Coyne, supra note 58, at 136; Zonana, supra note 62 (reporting in 1985 that discount brokers offered commissions at a 70% discount to traditional brokers); Richard D. Hylton, Now Fewer Firms Are Chasing Small Investors, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/17/business/all-about-discount-brokers-now-fewer-firms-are-chasing-small-investors-discount.html [https://perma.cc/DG8A-ZQAS]; Zweig, supra note 60 (“[T]he cost of trading has fallen by more than 80%—without adjusting for inflation.”); Zonana, supra note 62 (reporting on an interview with Charles Schwab in which he indicated that he initially offered a 50% discount to traditional commissions).

64 See Hylton, supra note 63 (explaining that discount brokers must cut overhead); Zonana, supra note 62 (“Discount brokers are able to undercut the majors’ commission rates and still make a profit because they lack the platoons of highly paid research analysts and commissioned salesmen of the established firms.”).


66 See Hylton, supra note 63 (describing financial products offered by Charles Schwab, such as certificates of deposit and mutual funds, and a reduced reliance on commissions).

67 See id. (discussing efforts by Charles Schwab to automate customer interfaces); Zonana, supra note 62 (describing discount brokers as “pioneering” the use of personal computers for trading); Jennifer Wu, Michael Siegel & Joshua Manion, Online Trading: An Internet Revolution 6, 9 (June 1999) (research notes, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), http://web.mit.edu/smadnick/www/wp2/2000-02-SWP%234104.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC2L-G2LL] (discussing the business plans of Ameritrade and E-Trade).

68 See Wu, Siegel & Manion, supra note 67, at 6.
directed day trader without need for much hand holding.\(^6\)

Still, certain building blocks of Robinhood’s business plan were already in place by the company’s founding in 2013: changing attitudes towards retail investors, a key regulatory shakeup, and a precedent for diversifying revenue sources away from trading commissions.

### III. ROBINHOOD’S INNOVATIONS

These historical antecedents notwithstanding, Robinhood has managed to do something new and significant. It catered its product offerings specifically to a new sub-strata of novice retail investors with small accounts. How did Robinhood make a viable business out of this previously dormant or overlooked customer base? This Part identifies three primary elements of Robinhood’s business success: technical product design, a new economic model, and ideological marketing.

#### A. Product Design

Robinhood came of age in an era of increasingly refined user experience (“UX”) design.\(^7\) UX design is a field dedicated to enhancing “user delight.”\(^8\) It is a maturing profession with its own cannon of design principles (“heuristics” in UX design lingo) taught at leading institutions.\(^9\)

Robinhood embraces contemporary UX design with enthusiasm. In its IPO filing, the company refers to its product as being “delightful” eight times—a

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\(^6\) See Hylton, supra note 63 (discussing the target Schwab investor as “investors who make their own decisions”); Zonana, supra note 62 (describing discount brokerages as “cater[ing] to investors who like to call their own shots” and describing customers who “furiously punch stock symbols into five Quotron machines and watch intently as orange luminescent characters reporting the latest prices of New York and American exchange stocks stream across two electronic blackboards”).

\(^7\) See Sheelah Kolhatkar, Robinhood’s Big Gamble, NEW YORKER (May 10, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/05/17/robinhoods-big-gamble [https://perma.cc/844D-96P3] (“They’re the first company that introduced premier user experience and design in a mobile application to finance . . . .”).


conspicuous word choice given its frequent use in UX design circles.\textsuperscript{73} Many features of the Robinhood app adhere to key UX design heuristics: familiar and intuitive controls,\textsuperscript{74} clear feedback on the status of user actions,\textsuperscript{75} and a minimalist approach to displaying information.\textsuperscript{76}

Of these design features, information minimalism is the most conspicuous departure from the prior generation of discount brokers. Recall that earlier discount brokers often catered to a relatively sophisticated, or at least enthusiastic, set of self-directed investors.\textsuperscript{77} As brokers built out websites for this day-trading clientele, it must have seemed advisable to stock the sites with as many research resources as possible.

Robinhood took a different approach.\textsuperscript{78} The research feature of the app, for example, is noticeably stripped down. Instead of starting with a crowded page of charts, acronyms, and indexes, it is dominated by simple “lists” bearing titles like “Daily Movers,” “100 Most Popular,” and “Crypto.”\textsuperscript{79} There are more advanced research features deeper in the app, but even these resources are circumscribed compared to legacy online brokerages. Ameritrade allows a user to chart nearly five hundred measures; Robinhood allows a user to chart five.\textsuperscript{80}

Besides avoiding decision fatigue,\textsuperscript{81} this minimalistic approach also expands the reach of the product by allowing for a mobile interface. In its IPO

\textsuperscript{73} See Robinhood Prospectus, \textit{supra} note 1, at 2, 7, 171, 178, 179, 184, 193. See generally Fessenden, \textit{supra} note 71 (discussing user delight and creating a delightful UX).

\textsuperscript{74} See Nielsen, \textit{supra} note 72 (identifying usability heuristic #4 as “[u]sers should not have to wonder whether different words, situations, or actions mean the same thing. Follow platform and industry conventions”). Examples from the Robinhood app are iPhone-style navigation (a “>” graphic denoting a sub-menu) and tab bars (a menu running across the bottom of the app providing immediate access to other sections of the app). See Robinhood Prospectus, \textit{supra} note 1 (depicting the app and these features’ use in the graphics prior to the table of contents); Robinhood Markets, Inc., \textit{Robinhood: Investing for All}, version 2022.50.0 (2022) [hereinafter Robinhood App], https://apps.apple.com/us/app/robinhood-investing-for-all/id938003185 [https://perma.cc/W545-8R99].

\textsuperscript{75} See Nielsen, \textit{supra} note 72 (identifying usability heuristic #1 as “[t]he design should always keep users informed about what is going on, through appropriate feedback within a reasonable amount of time”). For example, when a user registers for Robinhood he or she sees a graphic depicting which steps in the registration process have been completed and which steps remain. See Robinhood App, \textit{supra} note 74.

\textsuperscript{76} See id. (“Interfaces should not contain information which is irrelevant or rarely needed. Every extra unit of information in an interface competes with the relevant units of information and diminishes their relative visibility.”).

\textsuperscript{77} See \textit{supra} note 69 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{78} Robinhood Prospectus, \textit{supra} note 1, at 1 (“We believe investing should be familiar and welcoming, with a simple design and an intuitive interface, so that customers are empowered to achieve their goals.”).

\textsuperscript{79} See id.; Robinhood App, \textit{supra} note 74.

\textsuperscript{80} See Barber, Huang, Odean & Schwarz, \textit{supra} note 14, at 1343.

filing, Robinhood explains the importance of this “mobile-first” philosophy for ultra-retail investors: “By untethering investing from the desktop computer, we’ve seen new categories of people, including gig economy workers, first responders, construction workers, and many more, discovering Robinhood and becoming investors.”

The most controversial design feature of the Robinhood app is the use of “gamification” techniques. In design literature, gamification is defined as “the use of game design elements in nongame contexts.” Frequently cited techniques include the use of levels or point systems to increase user interactions with an app. Gamification has been used as a motivational tool in a variety of contexts, such as workplace, healthcare, and educational settings.

In a recent regulatory action, Massachusetts securities regulators pointed to two features of the Robinhood app that “gamified” the user experience. First, they noted that the app celebrated a user’s first stock trade with a burst of virtual confetti. Second, regulators focused on a waitlist feature that prioritized users based on how frequently they interacted with the app throughout the day.

It is of course difficult to prove just how pivotal UX design has been in Robinhood’s ascent. But there is evidence that users are responsive to the app’s core features, that the minimalist look and feel is one of the most conspicuous distinctions from first-generation discount brokers, and that the app is proving “sticky” even as competitors match other product features such as zero-commission trading.

[https://perma.cc/7PP5-N2RY] (discussing decision fatigue and recommendations for companies to combine fewer features in user interfaces).

82 See Robinhood Prospectus, supra note 1, at ii, 2.


85 See id. at 9.


88 See id.

89 See id. (“Customers who did not interact daily with the application watched their position on the waitlist precipitously decline, while those who succumbed to the psychological effects of Robinhood’s gamification soared up and up the waitlist.”).

90 See Barber, Huang, Odean & Schwarz, supra note 14, at 1341–45 (discussing herding episodes correlated to Robinhood’s “Top Movers List”); see Kate Rooney, Robinhood
B. New Economics

Robinhood’s newly acquired customer base is not just new at investing; it also tends to invest small amounts compared to customers of other brokerages. The median account size is $240 and the average account size is $5,000.

Building a product for small accounts required innovations. For example, Robinhood is a registered broker-dealer regulated by the SEC and FINRA. As such, Robinhood has an obligation to determine that an investor is qualified to engage in certain activities, such as options trading. To the chagrin of some regulators, Robinhood created algorithms or “bots” that almost entirely automated these determinations. Without these automated processes, making individualized assessments of many small account holders might not be economically feasible.

Robinhood also adjusted its product offerings to accommodate smaller trades. For example, it began offering fractional (partial) shares of stock. This practice allows small investors to purchase shares that trade at high per-share prices, such as Tesla.

The lynch pin for serving small customers was a new pricing model—commission-free trading. As discussed above, existing online brokers had already driven trading commissions to the $5 range. While these commission rates were low compared to historical standards and fees charged by full-service

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91 See Robinhood Prospectus, supra note 1, at 2 (reporting that over 50% of Robinhood customers say Robinhood was their first brokerage account).
93 Robinhood Prospectus, supra note 1, at 41.
94 See Second FINRA Action, supra note 92, at 17 (discussing an alleged violation of FINRA Rule 2360(b)(16)).
95 See id. (describing Robinhood’s “option account approval bots”).
98 See Robinhood Prospectus, supra note 1, at iv (“When we started Robinhood, we wanted to build a company that operated at 1/10th the margins of other financial companies, but with 10x the customers. This led to us obliterating trading commissions across stocks, options, and cryptocurrencies.”).
99 See Wu, Siegel & Manion, supra note 67, at 10 (discussing the emergence of first-generation discount brokers).
brokers, they still took a large chunk out of a small trade. Robinhood took a vital next step of eliminating commissions altogether.

Free trades might sound too good to be true, so it is important at this point to understand this business model in more detail. As mentioned above, discount brokers have been diversifying revenues for years. One important source of revenue, beyond charging customers commissions, is payment for order flow (PFOF).

PFOF has become controversial in connection with Robinhood, but it is a long-standing practice of discount brokerages. When a retail broker receives an order from a customer the retail broker can fill the order by either (1) executing the trade through an exchange, where the order would be completed at a nationally announced bid or ask price for a fee or (2) routing the order to a dealer who pays the retail broker PFOF for the privilege of effecting the trade out of the dealer’s own inventory or funds.

100 See id. at 9–10.
101 See Robinhood Prospectus, supra note 1, at 1.
102 See supra text accompanying notes 65–66.
103 See Robinhood Prospectus, supra note 1, at 1.
106 See Robinhood Fin., LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10906, Exchange Act Release No. 90694, 2020 WL 7482170 (Dec. 17, 2020) at 3–4 [hereinafter SEC Order] (“Rather than sending customer orders to buy or sell equity securities directly to national exchanges, Robinhood, like other retail broker-dealers, routed its orders to other broker-dealers . . . to either execute those orders or route them to other market centers.”). For cogent explanations of PFOF, see generally Robert H. Battalio & Tim Loughran, Does Payment for Order Flow To Your Broker Help or Hurt You?, 80 J. BUS. ETHICS 37 (2008); Alex Rampell & Scott Kupor, Breaking Down the Payment for Order Flow Debate, ANDREESSEN HOROWITZ (Feb. 17, 2021), https://a16z.com/2021/02/17/payment-for-order-flow/ [https://perma.cc/4Q66-KJUP]; and Matt Levine, People Are Worried About Payment for Order Flow, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-02-05/robinhood-game-stop-saga-preserves-payment-for-order-flow [https://perma.cc/TLJ4-BM5E]. I use the term “dealer” here, but the counterparty to the trade might go by other terminology, such as market maker, wholesaler, electronic trading firm, principal trading firm, or internalizer. See SEC Order, supra, at 3 (using the terms “principal trading firms” and “electronic market makers”); Matt Levine, Money Stuff: The IPO Market Was Too Good, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 7 2021) [hereinafter Levine II], https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2021-01-07/money-stuff-the-ipo-market-was-too-good [https://perma.cc/3MHR-27W9] (using the terms “dealer” and “electronic trading firm”); Levine, supra (using the terms “wholesaler,” “internalizer”, and “high-frequency trader”). For explanations of why it makes economic sense for the dealer to pay for order flow, see Battalio & Loughran, supra, at 38–39; Rampell...
Critics of PFOF worry that brokers will route orders based on the level of fees offered by the dealer rather than on the dealer’s ability to complete the trade at the best price for the customer.\textsuperscript{107} But brokers have a legal obligation of “best execution” and a broker runs afoul of this duty by sending orders to dealers who complete trades on terms that are unfavorable to the customer compared to terms available on exchanges or alternative venues.\textsuperscript{108} Due to competition and these legal obligations, customers can receive a better outcome (“price improvement”) under a PFOF arrangement than they would if their order was routed by the discount broker through the exchange,\textsuperscript{109} though there are reasons to question whether price improvement is as large as industry statistics suggest.\textsuperscript{110} 

& Kupor, supra; and Levine, supra. In essence, there is room inside the nationally announced bid and ask prices for dealers to profit even after taking into consideration what they pay for order flow. See Rampell & Kupor, supra (“When things go according to plan, market makers receive more and more orders and can often trade ‘inside’ the published bid-ask spread—actually improving the price you receive compared to the best quoted price on any exchange.”). 

\textsuperscript{107}See Who Wins on Wall Street? GameStop, Robinhood, and the State of Retail Investing: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 117th Cong. 45 (2021) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Professor Gina-Gail S. Fletcher) (“Under the PFOF model, brokers are incentivized to put their own profit-seeking interests above their clients in deciding where to route client orders.”). 

\textsuperscript{108}See SEC Order, supra note 106, at 4 (“Best execution requires that a broker-dealer endeavor to execute customer orders on the most favorable terms reasonably available in the market under the circumstances.”); Robert P. Bartlett, III, Modernizing Odd Lot Trading, 2021 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 520, 523–24 (explaining that for retail orders “best execution” is generally “defined as receiving the best price available across different market centers”). 

\textsuperscript{109}See SEC Order, supra note 106, at 4 (“Price improvement occurs when a customer order receives an execution at a price that is superior to the best available quotation then appearing on the public quotation feed.... [M]ost retail broker-dealers obtain price improvement on the vast majority of customer orders that they send to principal trading firms.”); Battalio & Loughran, supra note 106, at 43 (“On the whole, payment for order flow, although it sounds unethical, appears to be beneficial for investors.”); Rampell & Kupor, supra note 106 (“Today, retail investors benefit from trading at better prices than are publicly available—to the tune of $3.6 billion in 2020.”). 

\textsuperscript{110}See Bartlett, supra note 108, at 536–60 (finding that (1) odd-lot orders of under one hundred shares executed on nonexchange venues receive less price improvement than larger orders according to conventional measures and (2) conventional measures overstate price improvement because they exclude bid and ask information relating to odd-lot transactions); Hitesh Mittal & Kathryn Berkow, BestEx Rsch., The Good, the Bad & the Ugly of Payment for Order Flow 7–10 (May 2021), https://f.hubspotusercontent10.net/hubfs/4982966/BestEx%20Research%20FOF%2020210503.pdf [https://perma.cc/WGC4-CW8F] (estimating that standard measures of price improvement overstate improvement by 8% of the national best bid and offer (“NBBO”) spread); Dave Michaels & Alexander Osipovich, SEC to Review Market Structure as Meme Stocks Stir Frenzy, Wall St. J. (June 9, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-pursuing-broad-review-of-stock-market-structure-chairman-says-11623256566 [https://perma.cc/S859-6XX] (“I believe there are
Part IV will discuss regulatory actions against Robinhood based on its PFOF practices. For now, the key point is that eliminating commissions was instrumental in making a viable business out of small accounts, so much so that Robinhood’s competitors have followed suit.\(^{111}\)

C. Ideological Marketing

As with the NYSE’s “Own Your Share” campaign,\(^{112}\) Robinhood’s stated goal of “democratizing” investing is noticeably ideological. The company’s name is a clear reference to the mythical crusader against the elite.\(^{113}\) The company’s marketing materials are full of testimonials expressing feelings of empowerment.\(^{114}\) In interviews, the company’s founders cite Thomas Piketty and the Occupy Wall Street movements as key influences.\(^{115}\)

While it is tempting to dismiss the ideological messaging as typical Silicon Valley bluster, there are indications that it resonates with a meaningful portion of the user base. Robinhood is closely associated with online communities like WallStreetBets, where participants encourage trading strategies for “beating [hedge funds] at their own game.”\(^{116}\) Most famously, Robinhood users acting through WallStreetBets ran up the price of GameStop, a previously sleepy public company, in part to squeeze hedge funds that had bet against the stock.\(^{117}\)

IV. CURRENT REGULATORY APPROACHES

Robinhood’s regulatory problems have sometimes been as striking as its business success. In its short history, the company has attracted the attention of Congress,\(^{118}\) been a topic of conversation for an incoming SEC Chairman,\(^{119}\) signs . . . that the NBBO is not a complete enough representation of the market,’ [Chairman Gensler said.”).\(^{111}\)

\(^{111}\) See Kolhatkar, supra note 70 (“The commission-free trading that Robinhood offers its users has been so popular that its competitors, including Fidelity, Charles Schwab, and E-Trade, were driven, in October, 2019, to cut their commissions of around five dollars per trade to zero.”).

\(^{112}\) See Traflet, supra note 11, at 257, 266–67 (describing efforts by NYSE to create “a people’s capitalism” through share ownership).

\(^{113}\) See Kolhatkar, supra note 70.


\(^{115}\) See Kolhatkar, supra note 70.

\(^{116}\) See id.

\(^{117}\) See id.; Ricci & Sauter, supra note 12, at 51–61 (describing the ideology of WallStreetBets and associated trading activity).

\(^{118}\) See Osipovich, supra note 104 (describing Congressional inquiries).

and racked up record-breaking fines from FINRA and the SEC. This Part describes these initial confrontations with regulators.

A. Policing Payment for Order Flow

Robinhood’s initial regulatory entanglements arose from its heavy reliance on PFOF. As discussed above, registered broker-dealers have a duty of best execution, which requires them to complete customer transactions at the best available price. Because receipt of PFOF could influence a broker-dealer to route orders sub-optimally from the customer perspective, the SEC has for decades provided guidance on how broker-dealers can accept PFOF consistent with their obligations of best-execution. Under that framework, a broker-dealer must (1) disclose to customers the extent of PFOF received by the broker-dealer and (2) periodically assess whether the broker-dealer’s PFOF arrangements are providing competitive levels of price improvement. These obligations are further codified by FINRA in its Rule 5310, which elaborates on what constitutes best execution and requires broker-dealers to conduct “regular and rigorous review” of order routing decisions pursuant to written policies. Moreover, any communication by a broker-dealer to its customers regarding order execution and PFOF is subject to the general antifraud provisions of federal securities law.

In December 2019, Robinhood agreed, without admitting fault, to pay fines of $1.25 million to FINRA in connection with its order routing practices. According to FINRA, Robinhood in its early years failed to undertake the kind

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120 See infra Parts IV.A–B (describing regulatory actions and fines by FINRA and the SEC).
121 See sources cited supra note 108 (describing the duty of best execution).
122 See PFOF Release, supra note 105, at 55007.
123 See id. (adopting the precursor to Rule 607 of Regulation NMS requiring disclosure of PFOF in account statements to customers); see also 17 C.F.R. § 242.607(a)(1) (2021) (requiring broker-dealers to inform customers of PFOF compensation). For other disclosure requirements relating to PFOF, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10(a)(2)(C) (2021) (requiring disclosure of PFOF in confirmations of transactions), and 17 C.F.R. § 242.606(a) (2021) (requiring broker-dealers to publicly disclose PFOF arrangements in quarterly reports).
124 See PFOF Release, supra note 105, at 55009 (stating the SEC’s view that PFOF does not violate the duty of best execution if routing practices are subject to adequate periodic review).
126 See SEC Order, supra note 106, at 10–11 (finding that Robinhood’s misleading disclosures violated Section 17(a)(2)-3 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 17 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
of regular and rigorous review of order execution required by FINRA Rule 5310. While Robinhood did create a nominal best-execution committee, it failed to review all relevant order types, compare its routing destinations to competitors, and maintain adequate written procedures. These regulatory failures raised concerns that Robinhood allowed its PFOF arrangements to affect routing decisions to the detriment of customers.

One year later, Robinhood’s PFOF-related compliance issues escalated. In December 2020, Robinhood agreed, again without admitting fault, to pay fines of $65 million to the SEC for additional problems with its order routing. According to the SEC’s findings, Robinhood made misleading statements on its website. Though Robinhood did reveal its PFOF payments in SEC-required reports, it intentionally deleted reference to those payments in an FAQ entitled “How does Robinhood make money” in an apparent effort to avoid negative publicity about PFOF following a book by Michael Lewis. The SEC also found that Robinhood misled investors through claims about the quality of its trade execution at a time when internal reviews were suggesting inferior trade execution compared to competitors. The SEC therefore determined that Robinhood had made misleading statements in violation of the Exchange Act’s antifraud provisions.

Policy makers seem interested in reforms related to PFOF. Congress held multiple hearings on the topic. Most prominently, SEC Chairman Gary Gensler stated early in his tenure that banning PFOF was “on the table” because it presents “an inherent conflict of interest.”

It is both too early and beyond the scope of this Article to comprehensively evaluate the percolating reform proposals. Broadly speaking, one could imagine reforms falling into at least three categories. First, narrowly crafted proposals could leave the basic market structure intact, continue to allow PFOF, and focus

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128 See id. at 5–6.
129 Id.
130 See id. at 4–5 (warning that best execution is a “heightened consideration” when a broker-dealer received PFOF).
131 See SEC Order, supra note 106, at 1–2, 15.
132 See id. at 7–9; see also Levine II, supra note 106 (suggesting in an endnote that the book referenced in the SEC Order is Michael Lewis’s Flash Boys).
133 See SEC Order, supra note 106, at 9–10 (“Between October 2016 and June 2019, certain Robinhood orders lost a total of approximately $34.1 million in price improvement compared to the price improvement they would have received had they been placed at competing retail broker-dealers, even after netting the approximately $5 per-order commission costs those broker-dealers were charging at the time.”).
134 See id. at 10–11.
136 Salzman, supra note 119.
on improving market participants’ ability to gauge price improvement and execution quality.137 Second, reforms could simply prohibit PFOF to eliminate perceived conflicts of interest.138 Third, reformers could pursue more fundamental changes that not only eliminate PFOF but also push all trading to exchanges or a centralized auction process.139 The SEC has already initiated incremental reforms of the first type, and Chairman Gensler has signaled an interest in more sweeping reforms of the third type.140

B. Options Trading

A large percentage of Robinhood’s revenues are generated by options trading.141 Because options introduce new complexities and risks, FINRA requires broker-dealers to (1) accurately disclose the risks of options trading and (2) determine whether options trading is appropriate for individual customers.142 As described further below, Robinhood agreed to pay almost $70 million in fines and restitution for, among other matters, violating these obligations.143

137 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 108, at 560–67 (discussing possible reforms related to odd-lot trading).
138 See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 107, at 45 (“Congress should explore whether PFOF ought to be banned given its inherent incompatibility with best execution and brokers acting in the best interest of their clients.”).
141 Although options positions constitute a small percentage of Robinhood’s assets under management, options trading generates more revenue than either equities or cryptos. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (reporting assets under management for options, equities, and crypto); Robinhood Prospectus, supra note 1, at 144 (reporting revenues from options, equities, and crypto of $198 million, $133 million, and $88 million, respectively, for the three months ending March 31, 2021).
142 See infra Part IV.B.2 (describing FINRA rules relating to options trading).
143 The other matters for which this fine was imposed are primarily related to outages resulting from technical problems that prevented Robinhood customers from trading in March 2020. See Second FINRA Action, supra note 92, at 4–5.
1. Options & Associated Risks

Like most brokers, Robinhood defines two different levels of options trading. According to Robinhood’s website, “Basic Options Strategies” include:

**Buying a call option.** A call option is a right to buy shares of stock within a specified time and at a designated price. An investor who purchases a call option pays a premium for this right and generally faces maximum potential losses equal to that premium (if the option expires without value).

**Selling a covered call option.** When an investor sells a call option, the investor receives a premium in exchange for agreeing to sell shares within a specified time and at a designated price. Robinhood requires such an option to be “covered,” meaning the investor has the shares in his or her account at the time the option is created. Without covering, selling a call option would open the account holder to unlimited potential loss because there is no theoretical limit to how expensive the shares might be at the time the option must be settled.

**Buying a put option.** A put option is a right to sell shares within a specified time and at a designated strike price. A purchaser of a put option generally faces maximum potential losses equal to the premium paid for the put option.

**Selling a cash covered put option.** Just as an investor can receive a premium for selling a call option, an investor can receive a premium for selling a put option. Selling a put option obligates the investor to buy shares. Such an option is covered by setting aside sufficient cash to satisfy the future purchase obligation. A seller of a put option faces maximum losses for the full strike price of the option (less the premium already received) because the stock could theoretically fall all the way to zero.

Robinhood approves some customers for “Advanced Options Strategies.” These advanced options strategies are built by combining the

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145 See Basic Options Strategies (Level 2), ROBINHOOD, https://robinhood.com/us/en/support/articles/basic-options-strategies/ [https://perma.cc/CUY5-BRCD]. Basic options strategies also include “straddles” and “strangles,” which combine a call and a put on the same stock but with different strike prices. See id.
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 See id.
150 See id.
151 See Basic Options Strategies (Level 2), supra note 145.
152 See id.
153 See id.
more basic option trades described above. For example, a call credit spread involves (1) selling a call option (i.e., receiving a premium in exchange for agreeing to later sell shares) at a low strike price and (2) buying a call option (i.e., paying a premium for the right to later buy shares) at a higher strike price.\textsuperscript{155} The investor receives a net payment for initiating the trade because the premium received for selling the option in the first exceeds the cost of buying the option in the second leg.\textsuperscript{156} If the stock remains at or below the lower strike price, the investor keeps the net premium and the options expire as worthless.\textsuperscript{157} Losses are somewhat constrained because the investor can satisfy his or her obligation to sell shares under the first leg by exercising the call option under the second leg of the trade (albeit at a higher strike price).\textsuperscript{158}

Trading options—basic or advanced—involves risks that are not normally present when investing directly in underlying stocks. For example, selling calls or puts can trigger losses that substantially exceed any premium collected if the stock runs well above (for calls) or below (for puts) the exercise price.\textsuperscript{159} Even advanced strategies that involve hedging, such as call credit spreads, can result in some amount of loss beyond the collected premium because of the spread between the exercise prices of the two legs of the trade. Robinhood regulates these basic risks of negative account balances in part through cash or stock collateral requirements, but a loss against collateral is a loss nonetheless.\textsuperscript{160}

Importantly, collateral requirements are calculated assuming that the options strategy is properly executed in the sense of the investor monitoring the trade and understanding when to close out or exercise positions.\textsuperscript{161} Novice investors, however, may not be up to the task. For example, there is a small chance that one leg of an advanced options strategy will be exercised by a counterparty after the close of market, in which case it may not be possible for the investor to exercise the offsetting leg of the strategy before expiration.\textsuperscript{162} Such execution risks, which experienced traders can mitigate through closing out positions before a looming expiration, can exceed required collateral and result in negative account balances.\textsuperscript{163}

Options present other esoteric risks. For example, an investor who sells a call option may incur losses when the counterparty exercises near the time of a corporate dividend. In that case, the investor who sold the option may become responsible for paying the dividend to the counterparty out of cash reserves in the investor’s account, and it is possible this requirement leads to a negative

\textsuperscript{155} See id.
\textsuperscript{156} See id.
\textsuperscript{157} See id.
\textsuperscript{158} See id.
\textsuperscript{159} See supra text accompanying notes 148, 153.
\textsuperscript{161} See id.
\textsuperscript{162} See Second FINRA Action, supra note 92, at 11 (citing incidents involving Tesla stock).
\textsuperscript{163} See id. at 9–11.
cash balance.\textsuperscript{164} While Robinhood may alert investors to this risk as dividend dates approach, and may even take proactive steps to mitigate it, the investor remains ultimately responsible for dividend risk.\textsuperscript{165}

In some cases, advanced options strategies may result in large negative account balances that are temporary but nonetheless induce panic. For example, in a call credit spread, the option that the investor sells can be “assigned” (exercised) by the counterparty at any time prior to the option’s expiration date.\textsuperscript{166} Until the investor exercises the other leg of the spread, the investor’s account balance may display a large negative balance.\textsuperscript{167} In one tragic incident, a young investor named Alexander Kearns reacted to a temporary negative balance from a multi-leg trade by committing suicide because he mistakenly believed he had suffered losses of over $700,000.\textsuperscript{168}

As described further below, Robinhood uses an automated system to determine which investors should be qualified to trade options and at what level. This system is based on questionnaires that ask the user about his or her investing experience and an algorithm—deemed an “option account approval bot”—that interprets the results for instantaneous approvals.\textsuperscript{169}

2. Regulatory Violations Relating to Options

FINRA alleged two violations in connection with Robinhood’s options trading program: (1) inaccurate disclosure and (2) a deficient process for approving customers for options trading.

FINRA rules prohibit communications to customers that “fail[] to reflect the risks attendant to options transactions and the complexities of certain options investment strategies.”\textsuperscript{170} According to FINRA, Robinhood violated this rule by failing to adequately disclose many of the risks of options trading described above. In particular, Robinhood allegedly failed to explain how certain advanced options strategies used margin and could result in negative balances, with specific reference to the Kearns suicide.\textsuperscript{171} FINRA also identified nearly $5 million in customer losses from execution errors that Robinhood allegedly

\textsuperscript{165} See id.
\textsuperscript{166} Advanced Options Strategies (Level 3), supra note 154 (describing early assignment risk).
\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{168} See Klebnikov & Gara, supra note 20.
\textsuperscript{169} See Second FINRA Action, supra note 92, at 17–21.
\textsuperscript{171} See Second FINRA Action, supra note 92, at 7–8; Klebnikov & Gara, supra note 20. FINRA further asserted that the app erroneously doubled the negative cash balance. See Second FINRA Action, supra note 92, at 7–8.
contributed to through misleading communications with investors about potential effects of looming expiration dates.172

In addition, FINRA rules require a broker to conduct due diligence before approving a customer for options trading.173 The diligence is supposed to include investigation of the knowledge, experience, financial condition, and objectives of customers.174 The rule requires that this diligence be performed under the supervision of certain qualified personnel at the brokerage firm.175

FINRA identified many problems with Robinhood’s automated approval-bot system. According to the complaint, Robinhood approved customers for advanced options based on purportedly having three years of experience trading options when those customers were too young to have legally traded options for that long.176 Robinhood also allowed customers to immediately retake the questionnaire multiple times in rapid succession and prompted customers to change answers that precluded approval.177 FINRA further alleged that supervisors rarely checked the work of the approval bots.178

In its public statements, FINRA appeared noticeably frustrated with Robinhood and its compliance efforts. In a press release describing the record-breaking fine, FINRA’s head of enforcement admonished:

This action sends a clear message—all FINRA member firms, regardless of their size or business model, must comply with the rules that govern the brokerage industry, rules which are designed to protect investors and the integrity of our markets. Compliance with these rules is not optional and cannot be sacrificed for the sake of innovation or a willingness to ‘break things’ and fix them later.179

FINRA has expressed an interest in tightening its regulation of options trading. In a 2022 regulatory notice, it noted a sharp uptick in options trading in retail accounts and solicited comments on whether existing regulatory requirements are adequate.180

172 See id. at 9–11.
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 See Second FINRA Action, supra note 92, at 17–21.
177 See id.
178 See id.
C. Gamification & Suitability

In December 2020, the Massachusetts Securities Division (the “MSD”) made sweeping allegations against Robinhood under Massachusetts state law. In part, the complaint covered topics already scrutinized by the SEC or FINRA, such as improper approval of accounts for options trading and inadequate infrastructure resulting in trading outages.181

In addition, the MSD asserted more novel legal theories centered on Robinhood’s marketing and UX design. The MSD characterized Robinhood’s national advertising campaigns featuring “broke” college students as “aggressive tactics” that “lure[d]” inexperienced investors.182 The MSD also characterized Robinhood’s “100 Most Popular” and other stock lists as unsuitable “encourage[ment]” of, or “influence” over, inexperienced customers.183 Finally, the complaint criticized Robinhood’s gamification techniques as efforts to “lure,” “entice,” “stimulate,” and “encourage” customers to engage in “continuous” and “repetitive” use, with some Massachusetts customers averaging nearly one hundred trades per day.184

Massachusetts law was especially conducive to these novel theories. In 2020, the state adopted a broad fiduciary rule that applied to a variety of interactions between a broker and customer, such as recommending an investment strategy, opening an account, or buying or selling securities.185 According to the MSD complaint, these duties required brokers to exercise “utmost care and loyalty” when dealing with customers, and Robinhood’s conduct fell short of this standard.186 Robinhood contested the MSD action and

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181 See MSD Complaint, supra note 87, at 2 (summarizing the bases for the complaint).
182 See id. at 2, 9.
183 See id. at 11–12.
184 See id. at 2, 12–18.
185 See id. at 6, 21 (describing the adoption of the state’s new fiduciary standards and providing the relevant statute and rule). Specifically, the MSD’s fiduciary rule defines the following as “unethical or dishonest conduct” for which the MSD may impose sanctions: “Failing to act in accordance with a fiduciary duty to a customer when providing investment advice or recommending an investment strategy, the opening of or transferring of assets to any type of account, or the purchase, sale, or exchange of any security.” See id. at 21 (first quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 110A, § 204(a)(2)(G) (2022); and then quoting 950 MASS. CODE REGS. 12.207(1)(a) (2020)).
186 Id. at 19. According to the MSD, the duty of care under Massachusetts law means that the broker must “use the care, skill, prudence, and diligence that a person acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use, taking into consideration all of the relevant facts and circumstances.” Id. The MSD suggests this duty of care includes the obligation to consider suitability when “encourag[ing]” customers to purchase securities. See id. The duty of loyalty includes, inter alia, “mak[ing] recommendations and provid[ing] investment advice without regard to the financial or any other interest of any party other than the customer.” Id. According to the MSD Complaint, this would prohibit prioritizing the broker’s revenue over the interests of the customer when “encouraging” trading. See id. at 20.
the validity of the Massachusetts fiduciary rule more generally. Robinhood argued that (1) its advertising and product features are not the kinds of interactions to which the fiduciary rule applied by its terms, (2) the MSD exceeded its authority under Massachusetts law when adopting the fiduciary rule, and (3) the fiduciary rule was preempted by a less rigorous standard of conduct applicable to brokers under federal law.\textsuperscript{187} A Massachusetts state court ruled in favor of Robinhood on the grounds that the MSD exceeded its authority in adopting the rule, but it declined to rule on Robinhood’s other theories and the MSD is appealing the decision.\textsuperscript{188}

The current state of the MSD action leaves Robinhood in a precarious position. First, it is possible that an aggressive plaintiff could make similar allegations under applicable federal law. Under federal law, a broker has a duty of care to only \textit{recommend} investments that are suitable for the customer based on the customer’s “investment profile and the potential risks, rewards, and costs” of the investment.\textsuperscript{189} In other words, the obligation to make suitability determinations—an obligation that would likely be unmanageable at Robinhood’s scale—does not generally apply to a self-directed brokerage account and kicks in only when a broker makes a recommendation.\textsuperscript{190} Federal law, however, is not clear on what constitutes a “recommendation.”\textsuperscript{191} The MSD complaint provides a roadmap for trying to characterize various forms of influence over users as recommendations.

Second, even if courts interpret federal law more narrowly, the current state of the MSD litigation leaves the door open for other states, which are not constrained by Massachusetts administrative law considerations, to enact schemes that follow the logic of the MSD complaint. In fact, other states seem

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{189} 17 C.F.R. § 240.15I-1(a)(ii)(B) (2021). This rule is contained in Regulation Best Interest, which was adopted by the SEC in 2019. See Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, Exchange Act Release No. 86031, 84 Fed. Reg. 33318, 33321 (July 12, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15I-1). Suitability obligations, however, predated the adoption of Regulation Best Interest. See Jerry W. Markham, \textit{Regulating Broker-Dealer Investment Recommendations—Laying the Groundwork for the Next Financial Crisis}, 13 DREXEL L. REV. 377, 386–91 (2021) (describing the “shingle theory,” which is the traditional basis for a broker’s suitability obligations).
\item \textsuperscript{190} See Robinhood Complaint, \textit{supra} note 187, at 2 (“Robinhood is a ‘self-directed’ brokerage firm that does not make investment recommendations or provide investment advice.”).
\item \textsuperscript{191} See Markham, \textit{supra} note 189, at 414 (noting that Regulation Best Interest “did not answer the question of what constitutes a recommendation, which had long plagued the application of suitability requirements”); Fisch, \textit{supra} note 12, at 1857 (discussing when technological design might constitute a recommendation under existing guidance from the SEC).
\end{itemize}
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to share the MSD’s concern that “digital engagement” tools unduly influence investor behavior and have signaled support for the MSD initiative.\(^{192}\)

Finally, the SEC has requested public comment on how digital engagement tools should be regulated.\(^{193}\) In the request, the SEC specifically posed the question of whether digital engagement practices constitute recommendations for purposes of federal securities laws, thereby signaling an openness to the MSD’s characterizations of Robinhood’s activities.\(^{194}\)

In short, the MSD complaint presents novel and potentially far-reaching legal theories that are still being actively litigated.

V. A BETTER REGULATORY APPROACH?

Clearly, Robinhood has the attention of regulators. But are those regulators focused on the right issues, and do they have the necessary tools? Answering those questions requires consideration of a more fundamental question: what makes for effective investor protection?

The answer is complicated by the competing philosophies described earlier: investor choice protection, paternalistic investor protection, and investor-access protection.\(^{195}\) These philosophies do not always point in the same direction. For example, measures that limit certain kinds of investing to those deemed sufficiently knowledgeable or financially secure may in theory be effective paternalistic investor protection, but those measures may also reduce access and choice for investors.\(^{196}\) Similarly, efforts to level the playing field for more novice investors may promote investor access, but those measures may also introduce excessive risks to novice investors or impede market efficiency for other investors.\(^{197}\) What’s a regulator to do?


\(^{195}\) See supra Part II.A (discussing different approaches to investor protection).

\(^{196}\) See Cable, supra note 30, at 2270 (discussing how suitability requirements might operate to exclude from the market a hypothetical retiree with an appetite for investing in startups).

\(^{197}\) See id. at 2274–75 (discussing how policy makers might prohibit insider trading based on a philosophy of investor access protection even though some scholars assert that insider trading might improve price accuracy and therefore enhance investor choice).
One standard for evaluating a proposed regulation is to ask whether the intervention effectively advances one or more philosophies of investor protection without doing substantial harm under the other philosophical approaches. This Part evaluates current efforts to regulate ultra-retail investing under that standard and proposes new approaches that might achieve better balance among competing considerations.

A. Regulatory Critique

Part IV catalogued a variety of current and proposed regulatory initiatives. These initiatives can be roughly categorized as follows: (1) scrutiny of Robinhood’s revenue model (PFOF) under existing regulations, \(^{198}\) (2) scrutiny of Robinhood’s disclosure practices under existing regulations, \(^{199}\) (3) more aggressive and novel efforts to alter Robinhood’s product design such as banning PFOF and curtailing gamification techniques or other especially enticing app features, \(^{200}\) and (4) an inchoate desire by FINRA to revisit how retail brokers approve customers for options trading. \(^{201}\) In this subpart, I argue that scrutiny under existing regulations is likely to be either somewhat beside the point or ineffectual and that more aggressive efforts risk stamping out ultra-retail investing altogether.

1. Beside the Point (Best Execution and PFOF)

Scrutiny of Robinhood’s PFOF arrangements under current law is fine so far as it goes. There is no principled reason why Robinhood should escape consequences for brazenly removing reference to PFOF from its website and falling short of industry-standard procedures for evaluating execution quality and price improvement on customer trades. \(^{202}\)

It is far from clear, however, that Robinhood users particularly value these protections. As business writer Matt Levine puts it: “[W]e are talking about, often, fractions of pennies per share. If you bought GameStop Corp. stock when it was trading at $483, I simply do not care if you paid $483.01 or $483.007 or even $483.20, and neither should you.” \(^{203}\) This is especially true of the smallest investors, who have especially benefitted from the elimination of fixed

\(^{198}\) See supra Part IV.A.
\(^{199}\) See supra Parts IV.A, IV.B.2 (describing alleged disclosure failures in connection with PFOF and the risks of options trading).
\(^{200}\) See supra Part IV.C.
\(^{201}\) See supra Part IV.B.2.
\(^{202}\) See supra Part IV.A (describing regulatory scrutiny of Robinhood’s PFOF practices).
commissions and for whom the costs of poor execution quality are modest in absolute terms.

2. Ineffectual Mechanisms (Options Disclosure)

It is more plausible that Robinhood users would value better disclosure regarding the risks of options trading, but it is questionable whether this will prove an effective regulatory strategy.

Law and technology scholars have expressed concern that online environments amplify the kind of market manipulation that has long been observed in consumer transactions. Even in a bricks-and-mortar environment, retailers can manipulate warnings and disclosures to achieve desired legal results without actually deterring customers from harmful behaviors. Recent scholarship observes that online retailers are armed with considerably more refined data regarding consumer behavior than traditional retailers. Though this data can be used to enhance the consumer experience in desirable ways, it can also be used to harm consumers—so-called “dark” user-experience design.

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204 See Levine II, supra note 106 (“Robinhood’s appeal was largely to new investors with small accounts, many of whom were buying one share at a time rather than 100, or 2,000. Those investors saved money.”).

205 See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing violations of FINRA disclosure standards).


207 See Calo, supra note 206, at 1001 (“[C]ompanies and other firms will use what they know about human psychology to set prices, draft contracts, minimize perceptions of danger or risk, and otherwise attempt to extract as much rent as possible from their consumers.”)

208 See id. at 1002–03 (“[F]irms can generate a fastidious record of their transaction with the consumer and, importantly, personalize every aspect of the interaction. This permits firms to surface the specific ways each individual consumer deviates from rational decision making, however idiosyncratic, and leverage that bias to the firm’s advantage.”); Wagner & Eidemüller, supra note 206, at 593–94 (providing examples of companies using big data to create “rationality traps”). For a particularly dramatic example of how online platforms use data to guide user behavior, see Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust: The Facebook Study, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 193, 195 (2016), recounting how a “trust engineering” group at Facebook ran large-scale experiments on how small wording changes affected user behavior.

naïve to believe that brokers will design disclosure that does more than check a regulatory box.

3. Unbalanced Approaches (Banning PFOF & MSD)

The most assertive regulatory efforts and proposals to date risk stamping out ultra-retail investing altogether. This might be a satisfactory result under a philosophy of paternalist investor protection, but it makes for a poor balance with investor-choice and investor-access protection.

In the business press and political dialogue, banning PFOF is perceived as the most existential threat to Robinhood. These concerns cannot be entirely brushed aside. Heavy reliance on PFOF is one of the most distinctive features of Robinhood. It accounts for over 80% of Robinhood’s revenues. When SEC Chairman Gensler merely suggested that banning PFOF was “on the table,” Robinhood’s shares dropped by 7%. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge there are other ways for Robinhood to make money. PFOF is already banned in several countries, including the United Kingdom. Due to negative publicity surrounding PFOF, some U.S. brokers have already experimented with new revenue models. Robinhood’s primary competitors rely less heavily than Robinhood on PFOF.


211 See supra text accompanying notes 61–68 (discussing the rate structures and revenue models of first-generation discount brokers); supra text accompanying notes 98–111 (discussing Robinhood’s move to zero-commission trading).

212 See Osipovich, supra note 104.


214 Michaels & Osipovich, supra note 110.

due to their more diversified business models.\textsuperscript{216} One could imagine a future in which Robinhood adapts and replaces PFOF with a mixture of subscription fees for premium services, commissions scaled to small trades, “internalizing” some transactions,\textsuperscript{217} and charging fees for ancillary services such as research or branded credit cards.

On balance, PFOF reform does not inevitably spell the end of Robinhood, but eliminating the company’s primary source of revenue is at least a material threat to ultra-retail investing.

The MSD’s regulatory action has not received as much attention as PFOF, but it may present an even greater threat to the viability of ultra-retail investing. According to Part III, Robinhood’s catchy app and subversive branding were pivotal to the company’s ascent.\textsuperscript{218} The MSD theory turns these same features into triggers for suitability obligations (and maybe even stronger fiduciary obligations under state law) that would seem impossible to discharge at scale.\textsuperscript{219} In the short run, Robinhood could adapt by eliminating specific offending features. In the long run, however, the MSD theory creates a difficult environment for innovation by creating a fundamental tension between effective product design and regulatory compliance.

It may seem hyperbolic to describe these regulatory initiatives as mortal threats to Robinhood and ultra-retail investing in general. But the history laid out in Parts II and III above suggests that seemingly minor or cosmetic differences between Robinhood and its predecessors have made all the difference in activating this segment of the market.

4. Ineffective or Unbalanced (Options Approval)

As stated above, FINRA has both (1) enforced existing requirements to approve investors for options trading and (2) signaled an interest in bolstering those requirements.\textsuperscript{220} At first blush, focusing on this approval process feels promising. By calibrating product offerings to an investor’s individual level of financial sophistication, this approach attempts a certain kind of balance by providing access and choice to those who can handle it while protecting those who are more vulnerable. On close examination, however, this approach risks being either ineffectual (if brokers are allowed to continue relying on self-
reported experience) or unbalanced (if regulators demand a substantially more rigorous process).

Currently, Robinhood depends on self-reported information regarding the user’s investing experience.221 FINRA’s action focused on Robinhood’s failures to identify clear inconsistencies in such information.222 Even if Robinhood fixes the kinds of rudimentary problems identified by FINRA, there are reasons to doubt that self-reported experience is really an effective way to sort investors. For one, it would seem difficult to verify this kind of information. In addition, it is not self-evident that investors are in fact qualified to trade options just because they traded options in the past. Measuring sophistication through self-reported experience may suffer from the same shortcomings that have plagued other efforts to measure investor qualifications.223

One could imagine a different approach that tested the investor’s knowledge of options trading more directly. Robinhood could, for example, administer a quiz that tested knowledge of specific risks of options trading.

Assuming arguendo that Robinhood developed a valid test, one has to wonder about the effects on Robinhood’s business plan. Robinhood derives a large percentage of its revenues from options trading.224 These transactions result in substantially higher rates of PFOF than straightforward buy and sell transactions.225 It is simply hard to imagine there are sufficient ultra-retail investors with bona fide qualifications to trade options.

As with banning PFOF and imposing broad suitability requirements, one could respond to these potential difficulties by invoking paternalistic notions of investor protection and concluding that Robinhood should not exist. But such an approach is unsatisfying because it neglects investor choice and access.

B. A Proposal: Ultra-Retail Accounts

In light of the above critique, how should the SEC regulate ultra-retail investing so that investors are protected in some meaningful way but not excluded from the market altogether?

221 See Second FINRA Action, supra note 92, at 17–18 (describing how Robinhood’s “option account approval bots” rely on customers’ self-reported trading experience level).
222 See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing FINRA’s action regarding options approval).
224 See supra note 141 and accompanying text (breaking down Robinhood’s revenues by investment product).
In previous work, I advocated for what I called the “mad-money” approach to protecting investors. The mad-money approach does not try to make investing safe through disclosure or limiting participation to qualified investors. Instead, it allows investors to make risky investments within parameters.

The most prominent example of mad-money regulation to date is Regulation CF, which creates a regulatory apparatus for crowdfunding. In this context, crowdfunding refers to financing a business through aggregating small investments from large numbers of investors. Such a practice was not compatible with existing private placement exemptions, which generally prohibit broad solicitations of investors and limit eligibility to wealthy (accredited) investors. Proponents of crowdfunding therefore pressed for legislative action and SEC rulemaking to accommodate the practice.

Regulation CF and associated legislation employs a mix of traditional and more novel regulatory mechanisms. Most relevant to this analysis, Regulation CF features an investment cap. Individual investors are only allowed to invest a certain amount—generally capped at about 10% of income or wealth—in crowdfunding investments annually. This is a mad-money mechanism. It tolerates risk, but only to an extent. In doing so, it comports with conventional investing advice that seeks to manage risk by diversification across individual investments and across asset classes.

Online brokerages could be regulated by an analogous approach. The key feature of such a proposed regulation would be a limit on account size for ultra-retail investors. Accounts within those limits would be deemed “ultra-retail accounts,” and holders of ultra-retail accounts would have unfettered access to investment products without special approval requirements or suitability determinations. Such an approach would not exclude any investor but would

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226 See Cable, supra note 30, at 2298–303.

227 See id. at 2302–03.

228 See id.

229 See 17 C.F.R. § 227.100–504 (2021) [hereinafter Regulation CF].

230 See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 10–29 (“The basic idea of crowdfunding is to raise money through relatively small contributions from a large number of people.”).

231 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2021).

232 See Schwartz, Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, supra note 47, at 897–903 (describing acts of Congress and rulemaking by the SEC to accommodate crowdfunding).

233 See id. at 900–03 (describing regulatory requirements for crowdfunding).

234 See 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2) (2021). The investment cap is calculated in a somewhat complex fashion. For investors with income or net worth below $107,000, the cap is equal to the greater of $2,200 or 5% of the greater of income or net worth. For investors with income and net worth at or above $107,000, the cap is equal to 10% of the greater of income or net worth, but the cap cannot exceed $107,000. See id.

235 See Cable, supra note 30, at 2299–303 (discussing how investment caps can encourage at least modest diversification benefits).
provide a measure of paternalistic protection for every investor. In the subparts below, I flesh out the proposal.

1. Safe Harbor Status

The proposed regulation would operate as a safe harbor for a broker’s obligation to make suitable recommendations and to exercise due diligence in allowing options trading. Any investment activity conducted through an ultra-retail account would be deemed suitable for the investor, rendering moot the question of whether gaming techniques constitute recommendations.\(^{236}\) Also, even advanced options strategies would be deemed appropriate, eliminating the charade of individualized options approvals.\(^{237}\) Prohibitions on misleading communications\(^{238}\) and disclosure obligations relating to PFOF and options trading would remain intact.\(^{239}\)

As a safe harbor, ultra-retail accounts would not be the exclusive method for complying with existing regulatory obligations. In addition to safe-harbor accounts, a broker could maintain more traditional accounts. For those accounts, however, the broker should expect the full panoply of broker regulation to apply. This would presumably include a process for approving options trading that is more rigorous than the process that led to Robinhood’s record-breaking fines. It also may include restrictions on gamification and other digital engagement techniques, either under the MSD legal theory or other regulatory proposals that emerge from the SEC’s recent calls for public comment.\(^{240}\)

One advantage of this regulatory structure is that it lowers the stakes for introducing a new regulatory approach. Once again, crowdfunding provides a useful precedent. By some measures, implementation and uptake for Regulation

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\(^{236}\) See supra Part IV.C (describing claims by the MSD that app features are recommendations that may trigger suitability obligations under Massachusetts law and Regulation Best Interest). One could craft a narrower safe harbor that would shield only automated site or app features from suitability requirements, thereby leaving personal recommendations (such as a phone call from a broker) outside the safe harbor. Such line drawing, however, might create some doubt as to whether certain personalized recommendations generated by an algorithm should fit within the safe harbor. Because personally targeted features may in fact enhance the user experience, this Article’s proposal declines to draw distinctions between traditional recommendations and site or app features.

\(^{237}\) See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing a broker’s obligation to approve customers for options trading under FINRA Rule 2360(b)(16)).

\(^{238}\) See, e.g., supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing Robinhood’s alleged violation of Section 17(a)(2)-(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 and Section 17 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).

\(^{239}\) See supra Part IV.A (describing disclosure obligations relating to PFOF under Rules 606 and 607 of Regulation NMS and Section 10b-10(a)(2)(c) of the Securities and Exchange Act).

\(^{240}\) See supra Part IV.C (discussing the MSD Complaint and SEC inquiries into digital engagement techniques).
CF has been slow, perhaps due to flaws in the initial proposed rules. But Regulation CF was not the only compliance option, and crowdfunding platforms still managed to launch by relying on alternative exemptions that provide more latitude for sales to wealthier investors. In some cases, the experiences of these early platforms may have helped mold the final shape of Regulation CF.

Regulators are not the only ones who might learn from a multi-tiered approach to regulation. One could imagine ultra-retail investors “training” on ultra-retail accounts and eventually graduating to traditional accounts based on a demonstrated ability to trade options without large losses.

Admittedly, one might reasonably worry about a system under which brokers maintain two levels of accounts—one tailored to ultra-retail investors and another tailored to more experienced or wealthier investors. Ultra-retail accounts might develop into an inferior product overly focused on user delight rather than more sober investing. But there are at least two responses to this concern. First, such market segmentation already exists. The discount brokerages to which retail investors have historically gravitated have always been a stripped-down product compared to full-service brokerages. Second, this Article’s proposal does not leave ultra-retail investors unprotected. Rather it protects them differently by swapping out one form of regulation (current standards for options approvals and suitability obligations) for a different form of regulation (harder limits on the magnitude of losses).

A separate concern with having two levels of accounts is that information—such as stock lists—will somehow seep out from ultra-retail accounts to holders of more traditional accounts. This could happen through social media, for example, or because an individual maintains both levels of accounts. This is a dynamic worth monitoring. But I suspect that any technological or logistical separation of digital engagement practices from the ultimate trading account would go far in sapping the practice of its potency.

Ideally, the safe harbor would be created through coordinated rule making by the SEC and FINRA. The SEC could likely compel FINRA to cooperate if

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241 See Jo Won, Note, Jumpstart Regulation Crowdfunding: What Is Wrong and How to Fix It, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1393, 1405 (2018) (suggesting that use of Regulation CF was low as compared to levels of crowdfunding in other countries).

242 See Ibrahim, supra note 46, at 1496–99 (discussing FundersClub, an early crowdfunding platform that relied on Rule 506(c) of Regulation D for offerings to wealthier investors).

243 See id. (describing changes to Regulation CF that permitted the kind of issuer curation engaged in by FundersClub); Schwartz, Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, supra note 47, at 907–12 (describing changes to the final crowdfunding rules made in response to comment letters).


245 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the narrower product offerings of discount brokers).
for some reason that became necessary.\textsuperscript{246} There being no obvious reason for locally differentiated policy on this topic, this Article recommends that state securities regulators also cooperate and rely on the federal scheme to protect investors rather than pursue actions similar to the MSD complaint.\textsuperscript{247}

2. Account Size

The key feature of the proposed regulation would be a limit on the size of individual accounts: an investor could deposit no more than $1,000 in a qualifying account. If the account swelled in size because of successful investments, the investor could keep the gains invested or direct the gains to new positions. But the customer could not deposit new funds.

To an extent, $1,000 is just an educated guess offered here to spark discussion. The brokerage industry might argue that it is too low to build a viable business. While it is nearly four times the median Robinhood account, it is only about 25\% of the average Robinhood account.\textsuperscript{248} The primary response to this argument is that the safe harbor does not preclude larger accounts subject to the full range of current regulations.

From the regulator’s perspective, a useful comparator might be census data on household wealth. According to this data, median household wealth in the U.S. is approximately $100,000, with a majority of households reporting ownership of bank accounts, vehicles, real estate, and retirement accounts.\textsuperscript{249} At the 25th percentile, household wealth falls to approximately $5,500.\textsuperscript{250} Even at the 25th percentile, a $1,000 limit would prevent investors from concentrating assets in GameStop stock or a volatile crypto currency.\textsuperscript{251}

Of course, there will be some individuals at the low end of the distribution who have $1,000 or less of household wealth and therefore could put their entire life savings at risk through a qualifying account. But there are innumerable ways

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\item \textsuperscript{246} See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (describing the authority of the SEC to amend or abrogate rules of a self-regulatory organization).
\item \textsuperscript{247} If Robinhood prevails in its preemption claims, then state actions that are inconsistent with the safe harbor could be preempted. See supra text accompanying note 187 (describing Robinhood’s responses to the MSD Complaint).
\item \textsuperscript{248} See supra text accompanying note 92.
\item \textsuperscript{250} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{251} The kind of diversification prompted by the proposal might not be optimal. Ideally, an investor would spread investments broadly across individual investments and asset classes. In theory, investments in a safe harbor account could be correlated to the investor’s other assets held outside the account. But diversification does not need to be optimal to be helpful. See Cable, supra note 30, at 2299–303.
\end{itemize}
to misspend $1,000, including literal gambling.\textsuperscript{252} The proposal reflects a judgment to tolerate this level of risk out of respect for investor choice and access.

Even if the concept is sound, the proposal is admittedly primitive in some respects. For example, it sets a uniform standard for all investors. One could imagine a more finely tuned system, mirroring crowdfunding investment caps, that sets account limits at a percentage of individual wealth. Although Regulation CF adopts this more nuanced model,\textsuperscript{253} it is not clear how effectively crowdfunding platforms verify this information.\textsuperscript{254} The proposal opts for administrative ease over perfection.

The proposal also determines account size based on cash deposits rather than tracking account size based on the value of the positions over time. This is less than ideal from a personal finance perspective because best practice would be to occasionally rebalance (move some value from the account to other assets) as the account grows.\textsuperscript{255} Again, the proposal seeks only rough justice.

Perhaps the most significant potential criticism of the proposal is that investors might evade the $1,000 limit by opening multiple accounts, either by falsifying personal information and opening more than one account at a single brokerage firm or by opening accounts at multiple brokerage firms. The risk of multiple accounts at a single broker should be mitigated by a broker’s existing obligations to verify customer identity under anti-money-laundering regulations. FINRA, the SEC, and the U.S. Treasury already require a broker-dealer to establish a customer identification program (“CIP”).\textsuperscript{256} Under a qualifying CIP, a broker must gather identifying information such as name, date of birth, address, and social security number.\textsuperscript{257} Brokers are then expected to take a “risk-based” approach to determining when additional follow-up is required, such as requesting documents from the customer or verifying...


\textsuperscript{253}See text accompanying supra note 234 (describing the Regulation CF investment cap).


\textsuperscript{257}See id.
information through other means such as public databases. These regulatory requirements have given rise to a cottage industry of outside vendors focused on identity verification through automated records searches or artificial intelligence.

The possibility that a customer might establish accounts at multiple brokerage firms is a thornier problem. The crowdfunding experience might again be instructive. In promulgating Regulation CF, the SEC considered and ultimately rejected the concept of a central repository to aid in verification of investments across platforms. Although several commentators suggested that such a repository was necessary, feasible, and advisable, the SEC took a wait-and-see approach and committed to studying the need for a centralized system in a future report. When the SEC issued that follow-up report three years later, it did not appear to change its initial view that the administrative burdens and privacy concerns associated with a repository outweighed the potential benefits.

In a similar vein, regulators could take a wait-and-see approach with ultra-retail investors. It is possible that most ultra-retail investors find the $1,000 limit to be acceptable. And the headache of establishing and maintaining accounts at multiple institutions may be sufficient deterrence—in the way that state lottery games curb impulsive gambling by requiring bets to be placed in small increments at convenience stores. If evasion becomes a substantial problem, however, then a centralized repository of ultra-retail investors may be worth considering.

### 3. No Negative Balances

As described above, there are several situations in which an investor’s account can go negative, meaning that the investor owes a balance to the

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258 See id.
261 See id. at 71444.
broker.\textsuperscript{264} Such a possibility undermines the purpose of limiting account size. Therefore, the final element of the proposal is to prohibit brokers from collecting these negative balances for ultra-retail accounts. Ideally, this approach will result in brokers internalizing these particularly harmful losses and either withholding some forms of investment from ultra-retail accounts or bolstering efforts to take protective actions when negative balances are a possibility.

Though this aspect of the proposal may sound drastic, it may be preferable from the broker’s perspective to the alternative of regulators prohibiting investment products based on the possibility of negative balances. In addition, there is some indication in message-board gossip that Robinhood does not aggressively seek collection of negative balances in any event.\textsuperscript{265}

In sum, the proposal represents a balance between providing access and choice, on the one hand, and preventing catastrophic losses, on the other hand. What the proposal lacks in fine calibration it makes up for in ease of implementation. If certain features prove unattractive to brokers or susceptible to evasion by customers, the requirements can be adjusted over time. The key innovation is a new regulatory mindset.

VI. CONCLUSION

If we want to understand how Robinhood finally coaxed small investors back to the market, we should focus on how the company’s business plan differs from its predecessors: new pricing, engaging UX design, and effective marketing. Too many current regulatory efforts seem determined to slam the door shut on ultra-retail investing by viewing these same features as predatory practices rather than legitimate consumer preferences. This Article advocates for a shift in regulatory mindset. Like a diet that permits an occasional indulgence of good chocolate, rather than relegating the dieter to the disappointing sugar-free stuff, this Article’s proposal serves ultra-retail investors a modest portion of what they really want.

\textsuperscript{264} See supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the risks of options trading).