Requiring Majority Winners

Requiring Majority Winners

Election Law at Ohio State has been conducting scholarly analysis around the reasons for and impacts of requiring majority winners in congressional elections. This page provides an overview of our efforts and seeks to summarize the responses to two main questions: 

  • Why require majority winners for congressional seats?
  • What would the requirement mean for states in conducting elections?

Edward Foley has written about requiring majority winners in an opinion piece in The Washington Post and in an article in the Lewis & Clark Law Review which grew out of the AALS conference on Rebuilding Democracy and the Rule of Law in May 2021. You can view the 17-minute recording of Ned's talk at the conference.

Q: Why Require Majority Winners?

A: The Plurality Winner Problems

All but six states permit plurality winners in congressional elections, meaning that most federal lawmakers can be elected even if they do not secure more than 50 percent of the general election vote.

The main problems with plurality winner elections:

  • when a plurality winner receives less than 50 percent of the vote, the majority of the electorate, by definition, preferred someone else
  • third-party candidates -- some of whom may be broadly popular across the electorate -- are often deterred from running 
  • when third-party candidates do run, voters may not express their genuine preferences for third-party candidates so as not to "waste" their votes

Q: What would the requirement mean for states in conducting elections?

Our answer starts from the assumption that Congress would not mandate what type of majoritarian electoral system to use, but would leave the decision to each state.

Importantly, Arrow's "Impossibility" Theorem tells us that there's no perfect electoral system if there are more than two candidates. And so states would need to select from among many majoritarian electoral approaches - which can be significantly different in administration, timing, outcome, etc. In this way, states would serve, in the words of Justice Brandeis, as "laboratories of democracy" with the result that much would be learned from each state's approach.

So what are some options? 

First, let's look at the majoritarian systems currently in use in six states:

Washington and California's Top 2

  • Nonpartisan primary for all candidates
  • Top 2 vote-getters move on to the general election

Alaska's Top 4

  • Nonpartisan primary for all candidates
  • Top 4 vote-getters move on to the general election where Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) determines the winner

Maine's Ranked Choice Voting

  • Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) is used in partisan primaries and in the general election

Georgia and Louisiana's Runoffs

  • If there's no majority winner in the November election, then there's a runoff several weeks later between the top two vote-getters

Beyond the majoritarian systems currently in use in the United States, states might consider other proposed systems.

Below, we share resources related to two alternative majoritarian electoral systems that have been proposed by Edward Foley from our Election Law at Ohio State program: Tournament Elections with Round-Robin Primaries, and Total Vote Runoff.

Tournament Elections with Round-Robin Primaries (TERRP)

Edward Foley has written about TERRP in an article in the University of Wisconsin Law Review. You can view a 15-minute recording of Ned explaining TERRP from June 2021. Ned also discussed Round-Robin voting in an interview on MSNBC's Morning Joe in July 2021. 

Total Vote Runoff (TVR)

Edward Foley has written about TVR in a 2023 article in the University of New Hampshire Law Review. Ned also wrote an opinion piece in the Washington Post about TVR with Nobel Laureate Eric Maskin in November 2022. You can view a recording of Ned explaining TVR at the UNH Law Review Symposium on Contemporary Issues in Election Law in October 2022. 

Finally, we share a short paper from February 2022: Differential Electoral Outcomes from Variations of Ranked Choice Voting.

We illustrate how three different majoritarian electoral systems would produce different electoral outcomes from the same set of hypothetical ranked choice ballots.

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