An Invitation to the Rulemakers – Strike Rule 9(b)

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ESSAY

AN INVITATION TO THE RULEMAKERS—STRIKE RULE 9(B)

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It is a little rule. “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” Even without the benefit of the new Style Revision Project, Rule 9(b) seems clear. In contrast to notice pleading applicable to most cases brought in federal court, claims of fraud and mistake—and only fraud and mistake—should be pleaded with particularity. Simple enough, but why do the Federal Rules single out these claims to be treated differently?

Nothing in the Rule’s history explains this special treatment. Later rationalizations for the Rule’s heightened pleading standard are equally makeweight. At best, Rule 9(b) is an anachronism—harkening back to the abandoned pleading practices of the past that spawned the modern Federal Rules in the first place. This dubious pedigree, however, does not warrant its demise. Nor do the divergent standards of particularity used by courts dictate the Rule’s internment. Nonetheless, Rule 9(b) should go.

Federal procedure could tolerate the deadweight of Rule 9(b) if it were limited to its own short list. But 9(b) is not so benign. Instead, its malignant pleading requirement spreads to other claims deemed “fraud-like.” Thus, Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading now infects such “quasi-fraud” claims as statutory civil rights violations, defamation suits, and CERCLA actions. Academic criticism of judicially imposed heightened pleading goes largely unheeded. But we are in good company. Twice the current Supreme Court has tried to rein in this improper use of heightened pleading requirements outside of the narrow context of Rule 9(b) without success. It is time to lend the Court a hand.

The Federal Rules should be amended to eliminate Rule 9(b). Without Rule 9(b), the foundation for heightened pleading disappears. Federal courts will no longer have the pseudo-

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1 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).

2 The Style Revision Project is an ongoing effort by the Style Subcommittee of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure. Its purpose is to rewrite the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to improve their style, readability, and consistency, while avoiding inadvertent changes in substance. The Standing Committee approved the first phase of the project revising Rules 1-15 in June 2003. However, they delayed the publication of the Rules for public comment until August 2004.

3 See infra Part III.B.


fraud crutch to lean on when applying heightened pleading. Absent a lifeline in the Federal Rules, judicially imposed heightened pleading should perish. At a minimum, its spread would be contained. What havoc would this modest revision to the Rules reek in the fraud arena? Given the varying standards and inconsistent application inherent in heightened pleading, abolition of Rule 9(b) replaces uncertainty with clarity. In the end, a few more fraud claims might survive to be resolved on the merits—precisely what the Federal Rules intend for every other cause of action. Thus, this Essay is a simple invitation to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, and ultimately the Judicial Conference of the United States: strike Rule 9(b).

I. THE HISTORY OF HEIGHTENED PLEADING FOR FRAUD

A. The Common Law and Code Pleading Experience

The history of fraud pleading cannot be divorced from the history of pleading in general. What began as an oral tradition in the English common law courts, pleadings were reduced to writing sometime between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This transformation from oral to written pleadings brought with it increased emphasis on form. The ensuing system of specialized allegation bred delay, expense, dissatisfaction, and ultimately reform.

How did fraud and mistake fare under the common law pleading system? Prior to the merger of law and equity, fraud and mistake were grounds for equity jurisdiction; they could not be raised as defenses to actions at law. If a party wanted to raise a defense of fraud to a claim, it had to be done in a separate suit to enjoin enforcement of the legal judgment. The leading treatises on common law pleading note that when fraud is raised in the context of enjoining enforcement of a judgment it must be pleaded with particularity. However, when fraud pleading is considered in the legal, as opposed to equitable context, there is no mention of the particularity requirement.

In this country, common law pleading gave way to the reform of the Field Codes in the mid-nineteenth century. The Field Codes replaced common law pleadings’ preoccupation with form with emphasis on detailed factual development. This generated a new set of pleading problems. Courts developed an elaborate classification scheme for types of facts that could be properly pleaded to state a cause of action. Labels such as ultimate fact, evidentiary

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6 See Michael Moffitt, Pleading in the Age of Settlement (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 5-6, on file with author); Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 458 (1943).
7 Moffitt, supra note 6, at 5-7; Jeff Sovern, Reconsidering Federal Civil Rule 9(b): Do We Need Particularized Pleading Requirements in Fraud Cases?, 104 F.R.D. 143, 144 (1985).
8 See Moffitt, supra note 6, at 7-8; Clark, supra note 6, at 458; Fairman, Heightened Pleading, supra note 4, at 555.
10 See E. Bennett, Story’s Equity Pleading 297 (5th ed. 1852).
11 See J. Gould, A Treatise on the Principles of Pleading in Civil Actions (2d ed. 1836); 1 J. Perkins, Chitty on Pleading 137 (14th Amer. Ed. 1867).
12 The Field Code gets its name from the drafter of the New York Code, David Dudley Field. It was quickly adopted in most other American jurisdictions. See Marcus, Revival, supra note 4, at 438.
13 Fairman, Heightened Pleading, supra note 4, at 555.
fact, and conclusion were attached to allegations.\textsuperscript{14} Unresolved and conflicting hypertechnical distinctions between these concepts yielded a pleading system just as cumbersome and inefficient as the common law one.\textsuperscript{15}

A particularity requirement for fraud pleading under the Codes was not entrenched even by the end of the nineteenth century. The Field Code of 1848 did not include a particularity requirement for fraud.\textsuperscript{16} Nor did the pleading treatises of the period state such a requirement.\textsuperscript{17} However, by the 1920s, a heightened pleading standard for fraud was well-settled: “[a]ll the details must be set forth with the fullest particularity.”\textsuperscript{18} Why?

The explanation is unsettling. Pleading fraud with particularity starts as a standard originally limited to equity actions and concerned with protection of judgments. When fraud as an affirmative defense is deemed applicable to actions at law, the particularity requirement traveled with it.\textsuperscript{19} Arguably, an underlying judicial reluctance to reopen settled matters justified the extension.\textsuperscript{20} After the unification of law and equity, courts simply applied the particularity requirement of the equitable defense of fraud to common law tort actions for fraud because the word “fraud” was present in both pleadings.\textsuperscript{21} This extension ignores the obvious. Concern for the protection of judgments is irrelevant to the tort of fraud. Is there little wonder that modern courts have difficulty articulating a justification for heightened pleading?

B. Fraud Pleading and the Federal Rules

A reflex application of heightened pleading to fraud is not limited to only common law or Code jurists. The drafters of the Federal Rules behaved similarly. Adopted in 1938, the Federal Rules are a reaction to the inefficiencies and inequities of the previous common law and Code regimes designed to encourage determination of cases on the merits.\textsuperscript{22} To meet this goal, the Federal Rules de-emphasize the role of pleadings.\textsuperscript{23} Instead of the many burdens shouldered

\textsuperscript{14} Richman, supra note 9, at 970; Fairman, Heightened Pleading, supra note 4, at 555.
\textsuperscript{15} See David M. Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading, and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 390, 395 (1980); Richman, supra note 9, at 970; Moffitt, supra note 6, at 11-12.
\textsuperscript{16} N.Y. Code of Proc. (Voorhies 4th ed. 1855). {cited in Richman at n39}
\textsuperscript{17} See Richman, supra note 9, at 967 (concluding that particularity was not an established rule by the 1890s because the standard treatises on legal pleading excluded it).
\textsuperscript{18} CHARLES E. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 213 (1928); see Sovern, supra note 7, at145 & n.17 (collecting a myriad of sources from the period stating the particularity requirement).
\textsuperscript{19} Richman, supra note 9, at 967.
\textsuperscript{20} Id.
\textsuperscript{21} Id. Professor Sovern offers another explanation: fraud was a disfavored action. He relies on two student notes for authority, both of which rely on Wright & Miller. Sovern, supra note 7, at 145 n.16. The Wright & Miller treatise in turn explains that “the old cliché that actions or defenses based upon fraud are disfavored and are scrutinized by the courts with great care . . . retains considerable vitality.” 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1296, at 581 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER] While this is clearly a later judicial justification for retaining particularity, it does not explain the initial common law adoption.
\textsuperscript{22} See Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297, 318-19 (1938) (describing how the new rules foster merits determination); see also Marcus, Revival, supra note 4, at 439 (stating the drafters created a system that preferred disposition on the merits).
\textsuperscript{23} See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (2002) (stating Rule 8 was adopted as part of a simplified pleading system to focus litigation on the merits); see also Richard L. Marcus, Reining In the American Litigator: The New Role of American Judges, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 3, 11 (2003) (describing the Rules as greatly relaxing the pleading requirements).
by common law and Code pleading, under the Federal Rules, a complaint serves only a notice function.\footnote{Pleadings at common law and under the codes served multiple functions including: notice, factual development, winnowing issues, and disposing of sham claims. In contrast, pleading under the Federal Rules was designed solely to provide notice. \textit{See} 5 \textit{Wright & Miller}, supra note 21, § 1202, at 68 (comparing pleading function under the Federal Rules with previous systems); Moffitt, \textit{supra} note 6, at 3-4 (describing the four traditional roles of pleadings).} Thus, Rule 8 requires only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”\footnote{FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).} Simplified pleading under this standard is commonly known as “notice pleading.”\footnote{25 \textit{FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).}}

Despite Rule 8’s notice pleading innovation, the drafters carved out an exception with Rule 9(b): “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting the fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.”\footnote{26 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).} Unfortunately, scrutiny into why the drafters retained pleading with particularity for fraud leads to uncomfortable similarities with heightened pleading’s haphazard extension to fraud under the common law and Code pleading regimes.

The history of Rule 9(b) is scant. The text of the rule appears in the first draft of the Federal Rules and remains unchanged in all subsequent drafts.\footnote{27 \textit{Richman}, supra note 9, at 965.} There was no discussion of the rule in congressional or ABA hearings.\footnote{28 \textit{Id}.} The drafters themselves leave us a single cryptic message in the Advisory Committee notes of 1937: “See English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 19, r 22.”\footnote{29 \textit{Id}.} The English rule referred to provides: “Wherever it is material to allege malice, fraudulent intention, knowledge, or other condition of the mind of any person, it shall be sufficient to allege the same as a fact without setting out the circumstances from which the same is to be inferred.”\footnote{30 \textit{FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) advisory committee’s note.}} The Annual Practice also states: “Fraud must be distinctly alleged and proved. The acts alleged to be fraudulent must be stated otherwise no evidence in support of them will be received.”\footnote{31 \textit{Sovern}, supra note 7, at 146 n.19.} While we can conclude the drafters modeled Rule 9(b) after former English practice, the Advisory Committee note does little to explain why.

The chief architect of the Federal Rules, Judge Charles E. Clark, provides the best explanation for Rule 9(b): “While useful, this rule probably states only what courts would do anyhow and may not be considered absolutely essential.”\footnote{32 \textit{Id}. Clark also described the first sentence of Rule 9 as derived from Order 19, Rule 6 of the English Rules for the Supreme Court under the Judicature Act of 1937. \textit{Charles E. Clark, Code Pleading § 48, at 313 n.87 (2d ed. 1947).}} It is with this lukewarm
endorsement that Rule 9(b) retains particularized pleading for fraud, while the Federal Rules embrace notice pleading for everything else.

II. APPLICATIONS AND RATIONALIZATIONS

A. Application of Rule 9(b)

If Judge Clark was correct and requiring particularized pleading for fraud is “what courts would do anyhow,” how do courts apply Rule 9(b)? First a word about scope is appropriate. While Rule 9(b) covers allegations of both fraud and mistake, there is a scarcity of mistake cases. Rule 9(b) is essentially a special rule for fraud.

The classic common law fraud claim involves a business transaction where a seller misrepresents facts to a buyer that are material to the buyer. For example, in order to induce a buyer to purchase a horse, a seller falsely states that a veterinarian had just examined the horse and had pronounced it sound. The buyer then relies on the seller’s false statement that the horse was sound and buys it only to discover soon thereafter that the horse was terminally ill. The buyer might bring an equitable action to rescind the deal or raise fraud as an affirmative defense if the seller sues on the contract.

What then would Rule 9(b) require? The elements of fraud include: (1) a false representation of material fact, (2) defendant’s knowledge that the representation is false, (3) an intent to induce reliance, (4) justifiable reliance by plaintiff, and (5) damages. However, Rule 9(b) does not explicitly require the allegation of the elements of a fraud claim. Instead, the text of the rule states that the “circumstances constituting fraud” must be stated with particularity. “Circumstances” means the time, place, and contents of the false representation, the identity of the person making it, and “what he obtained thereby.” This requirement has been compared to the who, what, when, where, and how of a newspaper story.

The drafters did not think Rule 9(b) would be excessively burdensome. This expectation was probably reasonable if applied to the classic fraud model. Like the sale of the diseased horse, this type of dispute involves direct, personal, face-to-face contact where both parties would possess certain factual information. Consequently, the hypothetical horse buyer

34 For example, Wright and Miller note that few courts have addressed mistake and devote but a single paragraph to mistake pleading. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1298, at 660.


37 Although, it is probably wise to do so. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1297, at 590.

38 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1297, at 590; see Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Pleading fraud with particularity in this circuit requires ‘time, place and contents of the false representations, as well as the identity of the person making the misrepresentation and what [that person] obtained thereby.’”); Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1236, 10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]his court requires a complaint alleging fraud to set forth the time, place, and contents of the false representation, the identity of the party making the false statements and the consequences thereof.”).

39 See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990) (using the newspaper analogy); Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1100 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994) (same).

40 See Levenson v. B. & M. Furniture Co., 120 F.2d 1009, 1009 (2d Cir. 1941) (per curiam with Judge Clark) (rejecting dismissal of a fraud complaint that did not allege fraud “with as much particularity as is desired” because it was “only a pleading”).

41 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744-45 (1975) (describing the classic tort of misrepresentation); Richman, supra note 9, at 977-78 (describing classic fraud transaction).
would have little difficulty pleading the circumstances above. The same type of minimalist burden is found in Federal Form 13, relating to a fraudulent conveyance.\textsuperscript{42}

The only problematic pleading burden for a fraud plaintiff would be particularized pleading of intent or state of mind of the fraudfeasor. Realistically, a plaintiff could not be expected to know the state of mind of a defendant, much less plead it with specificity.\textsuperscript{43} Information as to intent would always be under the defendant’s control. Recognizing that such a standard would be unfeasible,\textsuperscript{44} Rule 9(b) explicitly allows intent to be pleaded generally: “Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.”\textsuperscript{45} With this standard, the Rules avoid an inherently unworkable pleading burden for intent.\textsuperscript{46}

B. Rationalizations

Given the history—or lack thereof—of the development of heightened pleading for fraud at common law, under the Codes, and with the Federal Rules, it comes as no surprise that our federal courts struggle to present a convincing explanation for Rule 9(b). However, there are four predominant rationalizations for the particularity requirement imposed in fraud cases: defense of settled transactions, protection of reputation, deterrence of frivolous or strike suits, and providing adequate notice.\textsuperscript{47} None of these justify Rule 9(b)’s continued existence.

1. Defense of settled transactions.—The classic explanation for a heightened pleading burden for fraud is the protection of judgments and settled transactions. Recall heightened pleadings’ common law history. The particularity requirement was first imposed when fraud was raised in a separate action in equity to prevent enforcement of a legal judgment. Reluctant to undo previous judicial orders, a particularity requirement allowed the court to be certain that

\textsuperscript{42} Federal Form 13 provides the who (Defendant C.D.), the what (defrauded plaintiff on a promissory note), the when (on or about), and the how (conveying all property to another to hinder collection on the note). See Form 13, Appendix of Forms, FED. R. CIV. P. This form complies with the rules. FED. R. CIV. P. 84. Similarly, Federal Form 7 provides a model for a complaint for money paid by mistake. Its single sentence substantive allegation provides little guidance as to what meets the particularity requirement. See Form 7, Appendix of Forms, FED. R. CIV. P. (“Defendant owes plaintiff ___ dollars for money paid by plaintiff to defendant by mistake on June 1, 1936, under the following circumstances: [here state the circumstances with particularity—see Rule 9(b)].”).


\textsuperscript{44} Vector Research, Inc. v. Howard & Howard Attorneys P.C., 76 F.3d 692, 700 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting the difficulty in meeting a heightened pleading burden for malice); see 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1301, at 674-75 (discussing the difficulty of pleading a state of mind with specificity).

\textsuperscript{45} FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).

\textsuperscript{46} 5 Wright & Miller, supra note 21, § 1301, at 674.

\textsuperscript{47} See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1296, at 579-82 (describing the reasons); see also Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999) (describing the purposes of Rule 9(b) as ensuring that the defendant has sufficient information to defend, protecting against frivolous suits, eliminating actions where the facts are learned postdiscovery, and protecting the defendant from reputational harm); Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing them as providing notice, protecting reputation, and preventing strike suits); Tuchman v. DSC Communications Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994) (providing notice, protecting the defendant, reducing strike suits, and preventing baseless claims).
the allegations were severe enough to warrant the risks of revisiting the judgment. However, as the particularity requirement migrates from equitable defenses of fraud to common law actions for fraud, the protection of judgments rationale is inapplicable.

A corollary justification of protection of settled transactions then develops. Because allegations of fraud are frequently at the core of attempts to re-open settled transactions, some courts demonstrate the same judicial reluctance to reconsider settled matters without particularized information. Heightened pleading ensures that the allegations are severe enough to warrant the difficulties inherent in re-examination of completed transactions.

The protection of judgments and settled transactions justification has largely faded away. Judicial protection for judgments becomes largely irrelevant as particularity is applied outside of that context. Similarly, contemporary courts generally do not express concern about reopening completed transactions. Presumably, more attractive rationalizations, such as protection of reputations and limiting frivolous actions, have supplanted the historical one.

2. Protection of reputations.—Many courts recite that Rule 9(b)’s purpose is to protect reputations. Proponents of this traditional view note that is a serious matter to charge someone with fraud because of the potential damage to a defendant’s reputation and the implication of moral turpitude. Consequently, such allegations should be curtailed unless one can go on record as to what specifically constitutes the fraud.

While reputational protection is much cited, its special relationship to fraud and particularized pleading remains under-analyzed. Consider the oft-cited Second Circuit opinion in Segal v. Gordon. The court clearly states the rationale: “the specificity requirement stems . . . from the desire to protect defendants from the harm that comes to their reputations or to their goodwill when they are charged with serious wrongdoing.” However, the only explanation offered is that it is a “serious matter to charge a person with fraud.” No attempt is made to explain how fraud differs from other equally serious claims or how heightened pleading would deter fraud allegations. When these issues are considered, protection of reputation is insufficient justification for the Rule’s retention.

If the goal is to protect defendants’ reputations, Rule 9(b) fails. First, it singles out only a small subset of claims where reputational injury is at risk. Whatever opprobrium may come

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48 See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text; Richman, supra note 9, at 964-65 (presenting protection of judgments rationale); John P. Villano Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 130, 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The requirement traces back to common law presumptions of caveat emptor and to the reluctance of English courts to reopen settled transactions.”).

49 See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1296, at 580 (describing the reluctance of courts to reopen completed transactions).

50 See, e.g., F. McConnell & Sons, Inc. v. Target Data Sys., Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 980, 982 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (requiring Rule 9(b) particularity because plaintiffs “frequently ask courts in effect to rewrite the parties’ contract or otherwise disrupt established relationships”).

51 See Note, supra note 43, at 1439 (“[C]ontemporary courts generally do not even express concern about reopening completed transactions.”).

52 See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins, Co., 607 F.2d 545, 557 (2d Cir. 1979) (contending Rule 9(b) stems from the desire to protect defendants from the harm to their reputations).

53 See Richman, supra note 9, at 961-62.

54 467 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1972).

55 Id. (citing the Barron & Holtzoff procedure treatise). Despite the weak analysis, Segal’s impact was great as courts drew on its rationale in resolving Rule 9(b) objections. See Richard G. Himelrick, Pleading Securities Fraud, 43 MD. L. REV. 342, 349 (1984).
from a fraud allegation, certainly claims for professional malpractice bring even greater risk of reputational damage. Nonetheless, particularized pleading does not apply. Nor does heightened pleading attach to other intentional torts such as assault or battery. Similarly, there is no particularity requirement for wrongful death claims, but certainly significant risk of tarnish to one’s reputation. The limitation of Rule 9(b) to fraud allegations is woefully underinclusive if the real concern is reputations.\textsuperscript{57} Indeed, the inclusion of mistake in Rule 9(b)—where no possible reputational damage could be at issue—spotlights the inherent weakness of the rationale.

Even assuming fraud poses a sufficient risk to reputation to warrant specialized treatment, the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) offers little protection. The lack of uniformity on pleading standards under the Rule creates uncertainty.\textsuperscript{58} Given this uncertainty, it is unlikely that potential plaintiffs are deterred from raising fraud allegations.\textsuperscript{59} Of course, nothing in Rule 9(b) bars the filing of a fraud claim. Once the fraud claim is filed, the reputational damage is largely done. Moreover, the procedural instrument to challenge such claims is a motion to dismiss. Rather than shielding one’s reputation, the motion practice surrounding dismissal adds costs, delay, and attention to the fraud claim.\textsuperscript{60} Even if the claim is deemed deficient under the Rule, the remedy is seldom dismissal with prejudice; the plaintiff lives on to replead.\textsuperscript{61}

While it is hard to quibble with protecting reputations, the rationale is insufficient to justify heightened pleading under Rule 9(b). Fraud is singled out when other claims present similar if not greater risk of reputational damage. Even as applied to fraud, heightened pleading is an ineffective means to curb risk to reputation.\textsuperscript{62} Consequently, some other justification for Rule 9(b) is necessary.

3. Deterring frivolous claims.—Another rationale for Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement is deterrence of frivolous claims and strike suits.\textsuperscript{63} When courts speak of deterrence, however, two different issues surface. One is concern for an efficient means of clearing their docket of meritless claims. The second is actual deterrence of future filings. According to proponents, particularized pleading under Rule 9(b) addresses both issues. It

\textsuperscript{57} See Richman, supra note 9, at 962; Sovern, supra note 7, at 173.
\textsuperscript{58} See infra notes 85-96 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{59} See E. A. Lees, Rule 9(b)—Who Needs It?, 3 J. CONTEMP. L. 105, 106 (1976); Sovern, supra note 7, at 171-72.
\textsuperscript{60} See Sovern, supra note 7, at 172. This is not to say that that Rule 9(b) has no effect. Potentially, it could lead to dismissal prior to trial and the associated savings in cost and adverse publicity. However, as Professor Sovern points out, victory on a motion to dismiss based on Rule 9(b) could be viewed as a technicality depriving the defendant of vindication on the merits. \textit{Id.} at 173.
\textsuperscript{61} See Nix v. Welch & White, P.A., No. 01-3186, 2003 WL 57936 (3d Cir. Jan. 8, 2003) (noting the court has consistently held that a complaint dismissed for lack of factual specificity should be given leave to amend); Wight v. BankAmerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 2000).
\textsuperscript{62} At least one commentator even suggests that if protection of reputation is the justification, serious questions as to the validity of Rule 9(b) exist because a rule designed to protect the defendant’s reputation may “abridge, enlarge, or modify” a substantive right thereby running afoul of the Rules Enabling Act. See Sovern, supra note 7, at 165-72 (arguing Rule 9(b) as applied to fraud based on protection of reputations exceeds the rulemaking authority under the REA).
\textsuperscript{63} A “strike suit” is a securities fraud suit or shareholder derivative action brought without a good faith belief in prevailing on the merits and advanced only for settlement value. See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 191 n.5 (1st Cir. 1999) (defining “strike suit”).
shortens the life and nuisance value of already-filed frivolous fraud lawsuits and also deters future frivolous filings.\textsuperscript{64}

Once again, a seemingly beneficial objective—controlling frivolous litigation—does not justify Rule 9(b). As a threshold matter, the perception that court dockets are filled with frivolous lawsuits lacks foundation. Professor Arthur Miller recently put it best, “the supposed litigation crisis is the product of assumption.”\textsuperscript{66} Those touting the view rely on anecdotes of seemingly silly lawsuits.\textsuperscript{67} Oversimplification by the media contributes to the perception by creating poster children for frivolousness such as the infamous McDonald’s coffee case\textsuperscript{68} and its newer sibling, \textit{Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp.},\textsuperscript{69} the McDonald’s child obesity class action.\textsuperscript{70} Consequently, despite the lack of support, belief in a litigation crisis fueled by frivolous lawsuits persists.

Even if there were a flood of frivolous cases flowing toward the courthouse, Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement could not stop it. Again, Rule 9(b) is massively underinclusive. It imposes a special pleading burden on fraud-based strike suits, but not other forms of nuisance litigation. Yet no rationale is offered for this different treatment.\textsuperscript{71} This underinclusiveness obviously impacts deterrence of filing future frivolous claims. Because it does not apply, Rule 9(b) has no deterrent effect on strike suits premised on nonfraud allegations.\textsuperscript{72}

As for Rule 9(b)’s supposed target, frivolous fraud claims, it is hard to imagine any deterrent effect. The unscrupulous plaintiff—the type who would file such a frivolous lawsuit in the first place—surely is undaunted by a mere pleading requirement. One determined to advance frivolous litigation need only cast the claim in terms of negligence, breach of contract, or fiduciary duty to avoid the pleading burden.\textsuperscript{73} Moreover, to the extent that frivolous fraud claims are filed, they will continue to be filed as long as expected defense costs exceed the cost of settlement.\textsuperscript{74}

Rule 9(b)’s usefulness as a tool to dispose of frivolous cases already on the docket is also limited. Conservation of judicial resources is admirable, but Rule 9(b) is once again ineffective due to its own underinclusivity.\textsuperscript{75} When the remedy is dismissal with leave to

\textsuperscript{64} See, e.g., \textit{Ross}, 607 F.2d at 557 (highlighting that Rule 9 serves to reduce the \textit{in terrorem} value of a lawsuit); \textit{In re GlenFed}, Inc., Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Rule 9(b) also serves to deter suits pursued for their settlement value, rather than their merits."); \textit{vacated on other grounds}, 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

\textsuperscript{65} See, e.g., \textit{Campaniello Imports, Ltd. v. Saporiti Italia, S.p.A.}, 117 F.3d 655, 663 (2d Cir. 1997) (identifying the prevention of strike suits as one of Rule 9(b)’s purposes); \textit{Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Servs., Inc.}, 20 F.3d 771, 777 (7th Cir. 1994) (same).


\textsuperscript{67} See Miller, supra note 66, at 987-88.

\textsuperscript{68} See Edmund M. Brady, Jr., \textit{The U.S. Chamber’s Attack on Trial Lawyers}, 77 MICH. B.J. 380, 382 (1998) (chronicling the facts of the case including McDonald’s superheating practice, remittitur to $480,000, and postverdict settlement); Liane E. Leshne, \textit{Shedding New Light}, \textit{TRIAL}, Oct. 1998, at 32, 34 (noting that the plaintiff required eight days hospitalization for her burns and her rejected offer to settle for $20,000).

\textsuperscript{69} 237 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).


\textsuperscript{71} See Richman, supra note 9, at 963.

\textsuperscript{72} See Sovern, supra note 7, at 174.

\textsuperscript{73} These claims would not normally be subject to Rule 9(b) heightened pleading requirements.

\textsuperscript{74} See Note, supra note 43, at 1440 (discussing incentives to file frivolous fraud claims).

\textsuperscript{75} Note, supra note 43, at 1441-42.
amend, more judicial resources are consumed. If a case is dismissed with prejudice, a different danger exists—premature dismissal of meritorious claims. This risk outweighs any residual advantage of Rule 9(b) especially given the Federal Rules guiding principle of merits determination and the availability of alternative procedural remedies to frivolous filings.

4. Heightened notice.—The final reason supporting the use of Rule 9(b) for fraud is notice. The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to give the defendant fair notice of the fraud allegations. Because of fraud’s intrinsic amorphousness, greater pleading specificity is necessary to let the defendant know precisely what conduct the plaintiff believes constitutes a fraud. The need for particularized pleading is enhanced if fraud claims reach back to cover actions of years before.

We have now come full circle. If the justification for Rule 9(b) is to provide notice, what does it add to Rule 8 and notice pleading? Nothing. Particularized pleading is unnecessary. A complaint alleging fraud must comport to the notice pleading standard. If the fraud allegations are too vague to respond to, a motion for a more definite statement or dismissal for failure to state a claim are still available remedies. Otherwise details can be developed through the regular course of discovery. Nothing surrounding the notice standard warrants specialized treatment of fraud claims. Indeed, it is ironic that a notice rationale—designed to create ease of entry into the courthouse—would be used as a justification to dismiss claims.

In sum, none of the four predominant justifications for Rule 9(b) provide an adequate explanation for why fraud claims should be treated differently. What then would happen to the universe of fraud litigation if Rule 9(b) went away? Very little. If the Rule is designed to restrict the filing of fraud claims, either to protect reputations or prevent frivolous lawsuits, it currently fails. Rule 9(b) does not stop such filings at all. At best it inserts another level of motion practice, especially where the remedy for failure to comport with the rule is amendment, not dismissal. If the Rule is designed to provide notice, it merely duplicates an obligation already explicit in Rule 8. At bottom, Rule 9(b) fails to achieve its purpose and duplicates a pre-existing obligation.

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77 See Richman, supra note 9, at 983; Note, supra note 43, at 1442.
78 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
79 Rule 11 provides a better, broad-based procedural tool to address frivolous litigation. See Richman, supra note 9, at 983; Sovern, supra note 7, at 175-76; Louis, supra note 76, at 1041. Summary judgment under Rule 56 is another alternative. See Louis, supra note 76, at 1041; Note, supra note 43, at 1443.
80 See, e.g., Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1236 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that the purpose of Rule 9(b) is “to afford defendant fair notice of plaintiff’s claims and the factual ground upon which they are based”); Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 248 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000) (same).
81 See, e.g., Abels v. Farmers Commodities Corp., 259 F. 3d 910, 920 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The special nature of fraud does not necessitate anything other than notice of the claim; it simply necessitates a higher degree of notice . . .”); Advocacy Org. for Patients and Providers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 176 F. 3d 315, 322 (6th Cir. 1999) (“The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to provide fair notice to the defendant so as to allow him to prepare an informed pleading responsive to the specific allegations of fraud.”); Miller v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 572 F. Supp. 1180, 1184 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (requiring greater particularity under Rule 9(b) due to the amorphousness of a fraud claim).
82 See Richman, supra note 9, at 964.
83 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 12(e).
84 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37 (discovery rules); see also Sovern, supra note 7, at 178-79 (describing the applicability of the normal discovery process to fraud claims).
III.  THE CASE AGAINST RULE 9(B)

A. The Unnecessary Rule 9(b)

Rule 9(b) is an historic relic that retains the fact-based pleading practice of the Codes for fraud claims. The results are predictable. Modern courts have no greater facility for defining or measuring the particularity necessary than their judicial ancestors. Decades of inconsistent treatment by the federal bench now obscure whatever the drafters thought was the proper way to apply the Rule. Uniformity is an illusory goal.

Many courts follow the “circumstances” approach rooted in the language of the Rule. Conversely, some courts actually require pleading the elements of fraud. Other courts require the particularity of Rule 9(b) to be simple, brief, and designed to give the defendant fair notice of the fraud claim. Still other courts vary the pleading standard according to the case with more complex cases being held to a higher standard. There are courts requiring exacting details such as, identification of specific documents with misrepresentations, the specific false statements, and where they appear in the documents; others accept the mere identification of categories of documents. Thus the lamentation of one district court punctuates the frustration: “No court has enunciated a test that casts light beyond the facts before it.”

Fellow proceduralists also search for a cohesive rule—largely in vain. “There is no uniformity of opinion about what Rule 9(b) really requires,” exclaims one. Another concludes: “determinations under Rule 9(b) necessarily turn on the facts of each case.” While agreeing that “cases can be cited in support of almost every colorable interpretation and approach,” Professor Martin Louis offers some guidance. His survey of fraud cases uncovers

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85 See Williams, 112 F.3d at 177; Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1236, (10th Cir. 2000) (requiring a complaint alleging fraud to set forth the time, place, and contents of the false representation, the identity of the party making the false statements and the consequences thereof); Specialty Moving Sys., Inc. v. Safeguard Computer Servs., Inc., No. 01 C 5816, 2002 WL 31178089, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2002) (stating Rule 9(b) requires the pleading of who, what, when, and where); Odyssey Re (London) Ltd. v. Stirling Cooke Brown Holdings Ltd., 85 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating Rule 9(b) requires the specific statement or omission, what makes it false, when it was made, who was responsible); see also 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 21, § 1297, at 590. But see McHale v. NuEnergy Group, No. CIV. A. 01-4111, 2002 WL 321797, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2002) (“Allegations of ‘date, place, or time’ fulfill these functions, but nothing in the rule requires them. A plaintiff is free to use alternative means of injecting precision and some measure of substantiation into their allegations of fraud.”).


87 See Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 557 n.20 (2d Cir. 1979) (pointing out that particularity must be harmonized with Rule 8); Denny v. Barber, 576 F.2d 465, 467 (2d Cir. 1978) (accord).

88 See Heart Disease Research Found. v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1972).


90 In re Commonwealth Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 467 F. Supp. 227, 250 (W.D. Tex. 1979) (Higginbotham, J.). Judge Patrick Higginbotham continued his gift for turning a phrase where heightened pleading is concerned in Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995). Writing for the majority of the court sitting en banc, he described the circuit’s use of heightened pleading as “the age-old dance of procedure and substance, here with the music of qualified immunity.” Schultea, 47 F.3d at 1430.

91 Lees, supra note 59, at 109.

92 Sovern, supra note 7, at 156.

93 Louis, supra note 76, at 1039.
two different judicial approaches—one lenient and one strict. The lenient approach finds Rules 9(b) and 8(a) working in tandem to ensure notice. If negligence in operating a car could be alleged generally under Rule 8 without specifying that the driver was speeding or drunk,\(^94\) the same standard would permit an allegation for fraud in the sale of a house without specifying the misrepresentation. Therefore, Rule 9(b)’s heightened notice requires pleading that the fraudulent sale was due to the false misrepresentation that the house was free of termites.\(^95\) This type of requirement imposes a minimal burden on the plaintiff. In contrast, the strict approach demands a higher level of factual particularity functionally equivalent of a prima facie demonstration of the factual validity of the claim.\(^96\)

The various approaches taken by the courts appear to be largely influenced by the rationalizations they embrace for the Rule. The result is a jumble of inconsistent standards and uncertainty as to what is necessary to meet the required level of particularity. If Rule 9(b) vanished, the contemporary notice pleading standard would fill the void.

To fully appreciate the effect of eliminating Rule 9(b), a subset of cases requires special mention—statutory securities fraud claims under the Securities Act of 1933\(^97\) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934.\(^98\) While there once was division over the application of Rule 9(b) to these statutory claims,\(^99\) this is moot. Congress now requires pleading particularity via the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.\(^100\) Indeed, the PSLRA goes well beyond the levels of particularity demanded by Rule 9(b).\(^101\) A gusher of ink has already spewed forth on the merits of the PSLRA and its heightened pleading requirements by both courts\(^102\) and commentators.\(^103\) There is no need to revisit this controversy now. With or without Rule 9(b),

\(^94\) See Form 9, Appendix of Forms, FED. R. CIV. P.
\(^95\) See Louis, supra note 76, at 1039-40 (detailing the lenient class).
\(^96\) See Louis, supra note 76, at 1040 (describing the strict approach). When Professor Louis moves from description to prescription, his view on the correct approach is not in doubt: “Nothing in the language or history of rule 9(b) requires this strict approach, which is so offensive to the general philosophy of the Federal Rules and so redolent of the dark ages of Code pleading. Consequently, I agree with those who have concluded that the lenient interpretation of rule 9(b) is the correct one.” Id. at 1041.
\(^97\) 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb.
\(^98\) 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ll.
\(^99\) Compare Segal v. Gordon, 467 F.2d 602, 605 & n.2, 608 (2d Cir. 1972) (using a demanding application of Rule 9(b)), with Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 n.3 (10th Cir. 1965) (refusing to apply Rule 9(b) to a statutory 10b-5 claim).
\(^102\) See, e.g., In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2002); ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2002); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 544 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 313-14 (2d Cir. 2000); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
statutory securities fraud claims will continue to be subject to heightened pleading. If heightened pleading yields any particular benefit in these types of cases, it will remain.\(^{104}\)

As for the run-of-the-mill common law fraud claim, the absence of Rule 9(b) will add clarity as to the appropriate notice pleading standard and uniformity in application. If this means a few more fraud cases withstand motions to dismiss, so be it. After all, adjudication on the merits—as opposed to the pleadings—is the goal of modern federal procedure.

B. The Mischievous Rule 9(b)

Given my prediction of little impact on fraud litigation from Rule 9(b)’s eradication, I expect yawns of bored indifference at this point. Why should you care about this minutia of civil procedure? The antidote for this narcolepsy is twofold. First, the mischievous Rule 9(b) does not stay put. Rather, its heightened pleading standard is imported into other areas of substantive law deemed “fraud-like” by federal courts. This application signals a second reason for alarm—ad hoc judicial rulemaking.

Rule 9(b) is contagious. It infects other substantive areas with its heightened pleading standard. There are three identifiable strains. One type manifests when fraud is a component of a larger claim. For example, under RICO,\(^{105}\) fraud-based predicate acts are often subject to particularized pleading.\(^{106}\) The reason given for application of Rule 9(b) is typically a protection of defendants/prevention of frivolous filings hybrid.\(^{107}\) Similarly, a claim for conspiracy to defraud may find the same treatment.\(^{108}\)

A second version of Rule 9(b) infection comes when the rationalizations for Rule 9(b) are used to justify the application of heightened pleading to non-fraud areas. Civil rights litigation is the classic example where courts routinely used the protection of defendants and prevention of frivolous litigation rationalizations to justify the improper use of heightened

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\(^{104}\) For a discussion of the relative merits of PSLRA pleading requirements in comparison to judicially imposed heightened pleading, see generally Fairman, *Heightened Pleading*, supra note 4.


\(^{107}\) See Nasik Breeding & Research Farm Ltd. v. Merck & Co., 165 F. Supp. 2d 514, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stressing that courts should “flush out” frivolous RICO claims because of stigmatizing effect on defendants); Brooks v. Bank of Boulder, 891 F. Supp. 1469, 1476 (D. Colo. 1995) (“The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to inhibit the filing of complaints as a pretext to discover unknown wrongs, to protect the defendant’s reputation, and to give notice to the defendant regarding the complained of conduct.”); D’Orange v. Feely, 877 F. Supp. 152, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (applying Rule 9(b) because of threats of strike suits and discovery abuse).

\(^{108}\) See Odyssey Re (London) Ltd. v. Stirling Cooke Brown Holdings Ltd., 85 F. Supp. 2d 282, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“A proper allegation of conspiracy to commit fraud in a civil complaint must set forth with certainty facts showing particularity: (1) what a defendant or defendants did to carry the conspiracy into effect; (2) whether such acts fit within the framework of the conspiracy alleged; and (3) whether such acts, in the ordinary course of events, would proximately cause injury to plaintiff.”).
The same misapplication of fraud rationales was used to impose Rule 9(b) heightened pleading on CERCLA actions. Courts directly apply Rule 9(b) to defamation actions. Even negligence—used as the model for notice pleading—has been targeted for heightened pleading based on Rule 9(b). This misuse of Rule 9(b) continues even after Leatherman and Swierkiewicz denounced judicial attempts at extension of heightened pleading.

The third form of contamination is even more difficult to explain—legal misnomers. Where certain types of defenses unfortunately have the word “fraud” in their general label, courts often assume that Rule 9(b) must follow. Consider “fraudulent concealment” as a defense to limitations in antitrust cases. While federal antitrust cases are typically subject to a four-year limitations period, the period extends if the defendant engaged in fraudulent concealment. To use the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must plead and prove three elements: (1) wrongful concealment of their actions by the defendants; (2) failure of the plaintiff to discover the operative facts that are the basis of the claim within the limitations period; and (3) plaintiff’s due diligence until the discovery of the facts. It is easy to see that the elements of this limitations defense are a far cry from common law fraud. Moreover, heightened pleading for this defense to an affirmative defense fosters none of Rule 9(b)’s

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109 The very first court to impose heightened pleading in the civil rights context based its application on a presumption of frivolousness and need to protect defendants. See Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960 (D. Conn. 1968). Heightened pleading based upon Rule 9(b)’s misapplied rationalizations proliferated through the circuits. For complete treatment of this issue see Fairman, Heightened Pleading, supra note 4, at 575-82. Amazingly, in the civil rights context heightened pleading continues despite Leatherman and Swierkiewicz. See Fairman, Myth, supra note 26, at 1030 & n.276 (listing cases).


111 See Jones v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 874 F. Supp. 626, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“Moreover, to the extent that plaintiff has made a claim of defamation, she has completely failed to identify with specificity the alleged defamatory words as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9.”). The fact that this case was post-Leatherman is especially telling.

112 See Form 9, App. of Forms, FED. R. CIV. P. (modeling a four-sentence negligence complaint).

113 See Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stressing the fear of future frivolous “McLawsuits” in dismissing a class action on heightened pleading grounds); see also Fairman, Myth, supra note 26, at 1047-51 (describing the recent extension of heightened pleading to the negligence area).

114 This is most amazing in the civil rights context—the very subject matter of Leatherman and Swierkiewicz. See Fairman, Myth, supra note 26, at 1030 & n.276 (listing cases).


118 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (listing the elements of common law fraud).
rationalizations. Nonetheless, courts often apply particularized pleading relying on Rule 9(b).

Another unfortunate victim of judicial misnomer is the defense to patent infringement based upon inequitable conduct—“fraud on the Patent Office.” Inequitable conduct as a defense to infringement requires proof by the defendant that (1) there was material information, (2) withheld or misrepresented by someone substantively involved in the patent prosecution, (3) with an intent to deceive the Patent Office. Again, the elements of the defense are substantively different from common law fraud. Likewise, none of Rule 9(b)’s rationales have force in this context. Yet, district courts routinely apply Rule 9(b) to the affirmative defense.

These pleading aberrations may be quirks that practitioners in the respective areas can tolerate. The cumulative effect, however, warrants inoculation. This is especially so given the ad hoc nature of the application of Rule 9(b) by the federal courts. Despite the Supreme Court’s clear admonition that the Federal Rules cannot be changed by judicial fiat but only through the rulemaking process, the district courts—often aided by the circuit courts—still embrace Rule 9(b) heightened pleading outside of common law fraud cases. One never knows when and where judicial extension may occur next, as its recent application to negligence illustrates. There is, however, a cure.

C. The Simple Solution

The easiest fix is to just strike Rule 9(b) altogether and renumber the rest of the Rule. An equally acceptable revision is to strike only the first sentence of the Rule leaving the following:

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119 None of the supposed justifications for the rule—notice, reputational protection, deterrence of frivolous suits, and resistance to reopening completed transaction—are enhanced by particularized pleading of fraudulent concealment as a defense to an affirmative defense of limitations.
120 See Donahue v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1423, 1443 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“Courts furthermore require particularity in pleading fraudulent concealment.”); see also Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose and Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating plaintiff invoking fraudulent concealment must allege facts showing affirmative conduct); Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389, 394 (6th Cir. 1975) (stating Rule 9(b) applies to fraudulent concealment); see also Saveri & Saveri, supra note 115, at 639-40 (“Courts granting these motions [to dismiss] often rely on the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b) or find that the plaintiff has not pleaded its claim with sufficient factual specificity.”).
123 See supra note 36 and accompanying text (listing elements of common law fraud); Weidinger, supra note 121, at 1197-99 (distinguishing between inequitable conduct and common law fraud).
124 See Hricik, supra note 121, at 920-34; Weidinger, supra note 121, at 1201-06.
126 See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168; Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515 (quoting Leatherman).
127 For additional discussion of the breadth of Rule 9(b) heightened pleading applied to nonfraud claims, see Fairman, Myth, supra note 26, at 1004-07.

(b). Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting the fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally.

This has the convenience of not having to renumber the remainder of Rule 9. It also serves as a reminder that the removal of pleading particularity for fraud and mistake does not alter the notice standard already in place for condition of the mind.

Having lived with Rule 9(b) for over sixty-five years, why should the rulemakers act now? This is not the first call for change. Indeed, it is precisely because these earlier pleas went unheeded that action is required. For half its life, Rule 9(b) operated in relative obscurity—then came Segal in 1972 applying Rule 9(b) to a shareholder derivative action to protect defendants’ reputations and prevent strike suits. The peculiarities of fraud pleading eventually caught the attention of scholars as the federal courts struggled for the next two decades to give meaning to Rule 9(b) in the face of the expansion of securities fraud litigation.

The Rule’s inadequacies were exposed by the troubling questions of what Rule 9(b) requires, the quantum of facts necessary to meet the requirement, and whether the Rule even applies to such statutory actions in the first place. The conflicting judicial answers to these questions further highlighted the problematic Rule. The rulemakers did not react. Congress did. However, the congressional attempt at uniformity in pleading securities fraud contained in the PSLRA only generated more uncertainty. At the same time, this congressional interference with pleading practice in securities fraud cases diverted attention from what Rule 9(b) requires to what the PSRLA requires. In the meantime, Rule 9(b)’s influence silently spread.

Left unchallenged, Rule 9(b) continues to contaminate other substantive areas of the law. This spread of heightened pleading based on Rule 9(b) to non-fraud claims is wrong. It

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128 E. A. Lees offered the first critical look at Rule 9(b) in 1976 with the aptly titled, Rule 9(b)—Who Needs It?. See supra note 59.
129 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (describing Segal). Segal was also the target of the earliest criticism of Rule 9(b) misapplication. See Lees, supra note 59, at 106; Michael D. Fishbein, Recent Developments, Pleading a Securities Cause of Action Under Rule 9(b), 22 VILL. L. REV. 1222, 1231-37 (1976).
130 A spurt of scholarly examination into Rule 9(b) and its application to securities fraud came in the mid to late 1980s. See generally Himelrick, supra note 56; Valerie L. Litwin, Pleading Constructive Fraud in Securities Litigation—Avoiding Dismissal for Failure to Plead with Particularity, 33 EMORY L.J. 517 (1984); Richman, supra note 9; Note, supra note 43.
132 While Congress strived for uniformity with the PSLRA, the result is a tripartite circuit split concerning the appropriate heightened scienter requirement compounded by intracircuit confusion. See Fairman, Heightened Pleading, supra note 4, at 603-08.
imposes a procedural burden that is contrary to the Federal Rules. It does so in an impermissible manner by ad hoc judicial fiat. Collectively, the heightened pleading burdens contribute to the erosion of the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules. Amendment is necessary now because the scope of the problem grows larger.

This is all happening in the face of explicit Supreme Court direction to stop. This strain of heightened pleading based on Rule 9(b) has become resistant to the Court’s review. As a practical matter, the Court cannot review the myriad of cases where improper fact-based pleading is imposed. Given the lower courts willingness to ignore the Supreme Court’s instruction when it does address heightened pleading, the prognosis for the future is bleak. There is a cure for this ill.

Strike Rule 9(b).

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133 The Federal Rules were designed as a single, uniform system applicable to all cases regardless of the substantive claim raised. This transsubstantivity is undermined when Rule 9(b)’s pleading standard is used in other substantive areas. At risk is the uniformity and certainty of notice pleading practice and the broader social justice benefit of access to the courts and merits determination. See Fairman, *Heightened Pleading*, supra note 4, at 622-23.

134 Granting certiorari in a scant 150 cases per year, the Supreme Court is not equipped to reverse the extension of Rule 9(b) to many substantive areas now subjected to it.