

Exhibit A

REBUTTAL REPORT

One Wisconsin Institute, Inc. et al.

v.

Judge Gerald C. Nichol, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
Case No.: 15-cv-324

February 16, 2016

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The purpose of this report is to rebut the January 16, 2016 expert reports of Professor M.V. Hood III and Professor Nolan McCarty.

Both Hood and McCarty make use of new data sets and methods relevant to my report. The new data and methods fall into the following categories:

1. Hood relies on a matching process performed by the Wisconsin state Department of Transportation to identify individuals in the SVRS who do not, he claims, possess current driver's licenses or IDs, but who have, according to DOT, a record of possessing a license or ID that may have expired or otherwise no longer be valid (Expert Report of M.V. Hood III, 27, and 29-31; hereafter cited as "Hood Report").
2. Hood represents that Wisconsin's Voter ID law is comparable to other states with voter ID laws in the types of ID accepted (Hood Report, 35-37).
3. Hood argues that the effects of Act 23 are mitigated because voters without the necessary underlying identification documents can still petition to obtain a state ID (Hood Report, 31-33).
4. Hood argues that the lack of provisional ballots in elections held since the voter ID law has been in effect demonstrates that the law has no effect on the ability to vote. (Hood Report, 38-39).
5. McCarty uses a weighting method applied to previous voting history to argue that aggregate turnout did not decline between 2010 and 2014 (Expert Report of Nolan McCarty, 5-13; hereafter referred to as "McCarty Report").

I. Hood's Linking of SVRS and DOT data

Professor Hood's method of linking individuals in the Statewide Voter Registration System (SVRS) to the Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) file of driver's licenses and IDs is analogous to mine, with one exception. Hood's match step 2 links based on a match of last name, date of birth, and the last four digits of the individual's social security number recorded in the SVRS, matched to the equivalent data in the DOT file.

This method is certain to produce some false matches, as this triplicate combination is not unique in either the SVRS or the DOT records. In Hood's data file (VR.csv), there are a total of 85,171 records in which more than one person has the same set of values on this combination, including 35,967 records duplicated once (i.e., two individuals with same values) and 2,891 records duplicated twice (i.e., three individuals with the same values). These duplicates comprise almost 7% of the total matches Hood found in this step. While Hood does not break out the number of unique matches he found on this triplicate (meaning the number of records who link in this step that are not captured in any of the others), it is a certainty that he is overstating the number of true matches. This might explain, at least in part, why Hood's number of unmatched records (242,393) is lower than the number I found (283,346).

Hood reports that he found 119,421 unmatched records in the SVRS with a driver's license or ID number recorded in the state ID field in the SVRS. He sent these records to the DOT, which found that 89,077 actually possessed a valid license or ID. He counts all of these individuals as matched, which reduces the number of unmatched records to $242,393 - 89,077 =$

153,316 registrants, or 4.54% of the total. Hood then speculates, without any evidence specific to Wisconsin, that the actual rate of non-possession should be below 3.0% (Hood Report, 27).

Hood does not specify the precise method that DOT used to identify these matches, and it is impossible to assess the validity of that method in the absence of these details. The only information Hood provides is a statement that “DOT was able to match” some of these records and a claim that 89,077 of these possessed “Act 23 compliant” ID (Hood Report, 30). We know nothing about the fields the DOT used to identify individuals, or whether it relied on exact matching or probabilistic matching. Hood seems to imply (Hood Report, 27) that some of these individuals might possess a recently expired license or ID, but it is unclear whether this is what the results indicate.

I note that this calculation of the percentage of unmatched registered voters (4.54%) is lower than the percentage identified in Hood’s own studies of voter ID in other states (5.8% in Georgia),¹ previous expert analysis of Wisconsin (a non-match rate of 8.8%)², survey research of the non-possession rates of all acceptable forms of ID in Milwaukee, WI (9.5% of eligible voters),³ and analysis of non-matching rates among all forms of ID in North Carolina (6.1%, although North Carolina allows Veterans Administration IDs, which Wisconsin does not, and has a much larger number of military personnel than Wisconsin).⁴

I dispute, therefore, that Hood’s 4.54% figure, much less his 3.0% guess, is an accurate measure of the number of registered voters who do not possess the most common form of qualifying IDs.

Nevertheless, *even if we accept Hood’s calculation of the non-possession rate*, that calculation still supports the conclusion that not possessing a voter ID has a large and statistically significant negative effect on the probability that an individual voted. 153,316 registered voters remains a significant number of otherwise qualified electors who face barriers to voting in Wisconsin elections because of the voter ID law, and who in many cases will simply be unable to vote if they do not have a qualifying ID.

I replicated my original analysis using Hood’s specification of individuals in the SVRS who do not match onto the DOT file, recalculating the variable for ID non-possession based on his matching process.⁵ As Tables 1 and 2 show, the effects change slightly, but even with

¹ M.V. Hood III and Charles S. Bullock III, “Worth a Thousand Words? An Analysis of Georgia’s Voter Identification Statute,” *American Politics Research* 36:55-579,565.

² Supplemental Declaration of Leland Betty at 2, *Frank v. Walker*, Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-01128(LA) (E.D. Wis.).

³ *Rates of Possession of Accepted Photo Identification, Among Different Subgroups in the Eligible Voter Population, Milwaukee County, WI*, Expert Report submitted by Matt A. Barreto and Gabriel R. Sanchez at 16, *Frank v. Walker*, Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-01128(LA) (E.D. Wis.).

⁴ Declaration of Charles Stewart III at 36, *United States v. North Carolina*, 13-CV-861 (M.D.N.C.) (Dkt. No. 269, Ex. 1). In 2013, North Carolina had 108,926 active duty military personnel and 769,384 veterans residing in the state. See North Carolina Department of Commerce, *The Economic Impact of the Military in North Carolina*. NC Department of Commerce, Labor & Economic Analysis Division (2013).

⁵ I also corrected a coding error in my original analysis; see Appendix A.

Hood's smaller population of registrants without an ID, not having an ID has a large and statistically significant *negative* effect on voting. As table 2 indicates, those who do not possess an ID according to Hood's method were 16.9 percentage points less likely to vote in 2014 in the base model (Model 1), and 17.5 percentage points less likely to vote in 2014 among those who registered between the recall and the 2014 election (Model 2).

In sum, even using Hood's data on matches to the DOT file, in 2014 the 153,322 individuals who do not possess a driver's license or ID were significantly less likely to vote than individuals who had those documents. This remains a significant negative effect of the ID requirement.

Hood's dismissal of the impact of Act 23 contradicts his published work, in which he has argued that voter ID laws do in fact lower turnout, *especially among voters who do not possess a driver's license or state ID*. In a 2014 study of Georgia's ID law, Hood concludes that "from empirical observation, we now know that [Georgia's Voter ID] requirement suppressed turnout,"⁶ reducing turnout by 6.5% among those who did not possess the necessary identification and by as much as 9.5% for certain demographic groups.⁷ Hood characterized this turnout-depressing effect as a "negative externality" of voter ID laws.⁸

As I note below, Georgia's voter ID law is significantly looser than Wisconsin's, because Georgia permits a much broader set of allowable IDs (Georgia allows any government-issued ID, and Veterans Administration ID) and does not require an ID to vote absentee. There is every reason to believe the impact in Wisconsin will be larger than what Hood found in Georgia.

II. Comparing Wisconsin's Voter ID Law to Laws in Other States

Hood compares the forms of qualifying IDs in Wisconsin under Act 23 with other states (North Carolina, Texas, Georgia, and South Carolina), and concludes that Wisconsin Act 23 "is no different from similar state statutes," with a "heavy degree of overlap with other states" (Hood Report, 37).

This comparison is misleading, because Hood is indirectly claiming that Act 23 is similar to the ID laws in other states. That is incorrect. Of the other states Hood uses for his comparison, two (North Carolina and South Carolina) are not even classified as "Strict Photo ID" states by the National Conference of State Legislatures,⁹ because voters lacking a qualifying ID can use alternative non-photo ID documents to vote (including a date of birth and last 4 digits of a Social Security number in North Carolina). North Carolina allows voters to use licenses or IDs that have been expired for up to four years.¹⁰ Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina do not require a photo ID to vote absentee (as Wisconsin does), and Texas does not require

⁶ M.V. Hood III and Charles S. Bullock III, "Much Ado About Nothing? An Empirical Assessment of the Georgia Voter Identification Statute." *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 12:394-414 (2014), p. 410.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 408-409.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 410.

⁹ <http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx>.

¹⁰ <http://www.voterid.nc.gov/photo-id.html>

photo-ID for mail in absentee ballots.¹¹ North Carolina allows newly registered voters to use an out-of-state photo ID if they have registered to vote within 90 days of an election.

Texas, Georgia, and North Carolina permit voters to use a Veterans Administration ID for voting; according to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, in 2014 there were nearly 1.7 million military veterans living in Texas, 753,000 in Georgia, and 775,000 in North Carolina.¹² Texas allows the use of Concealed Weapons Carry permits for voting.¹³

Furthermore, with respect to the Texas voter ID law, a federal district court found, and a circuit court agreed, that the Texas Voter ID statute violated the Voting Rights Act because it had a disproportionate impact on Latino and African American voters.¹⁴ The district court also found that this discrimination was intentional.¹⁵

In the limited forms of qualifying IDs and the requirement to provide a photo-ID to vote absentee, Wisconsin's ID law is much stricter than any of the other states Hood cites in his report. Wisconsin's law is among the most restrictive, if not the most restrictive, in the country.

III. Hood's Claims About the Petition Process for Obtaining an ID Without Underlying Documents

Hood claims that Wisconsin's program of offering a no-cost voter ID will "[mitigate] the negative effect of Act 23" (report, p. 31).

For voters who lack the underlying documentation necessary for obtaining that ID, such as a birth certificate, or who would have to pay to obtain that documentation, Wisconsin offers a petition process, which Hood cites as "another point of mitigation to the State's voter ID law" (Hood Report, 32). Through that process, individuals may request that the DOT verify their identity by contacting other governmental agencies, or even by relying on secondary documentation. He cites DOT data that between September 15, 2014 and November 30, 2015, 1,022 individuals initiated this petition request process. He cites a total of 16 denials as evidence that the petition process works (Hood Report, 33).

The figure of 16 denials is the wrong measure of the difficulty of the petition process. More recent DOT data show that of the 1,062 petitions filed as of December 31, 2015, 61 were

¹¹ Voters who are over the age of 65, disabled, or out of their home county on election day are permitted to cast mail-in ballots without an ID. <http://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/voter/reqabbbm.shtml>.

¹² http://www.va.gov/vetdata/veteran_population.asp.

¹³ According to the Texas Department of Public Safety, there were 940,877 such permits on December 31, 2015. <https://www.txdps.state.tx.us/rsd/chl/reports/ActLicAndInstr/ActiveLicandInstr2015.pdf/>.

¹⁴ *Veasey v. Perry*, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014) *aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott*, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015).

¹⁵ *Veasey*, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 703 ("This Court concludes that the evidence in the record demonstrates that proponents of SB 14 within the 82nd Texas Legislature were motivated, at the very least in part, because of and not merely in spite of the voter ID law's detrimental effects on the African-American and Hispanic electorate. As such, SB 14 violates the VRA as well as the 14th and 15th Amendments to the United States Constitution.").

cancelled by the petitioner, and another 66 were in suspended status (meaning that the petitioner had not responded for six months). For the reasons explained below, this total (16+66+61=143) is a more accurate measure of the failure rate.

For some, the petition process will be relatively straightforward – tracking down an errant birth certificate, or confirming identity through the Social Security Administration. For others, the process can accurately be described as Kafkaesque: repeated unsuccessful efforts to obtain information from unresponsive state agencies (especially those out of state), confusion over trivial spelling differences in names, multiple requests for information from the DOT over months, repeated submission of forms, processing errors, and confusion among DOT officials about what is acceptable proof. An internal DOT investigation of the petition process found that 27% of all petitions initiated between March 22 and August 1, 2015 were processed erroneously – either by DOT regional officials sending the petitions to the wrong office or email address, failing to insure that the form (the MV3012) was completed correctly by the petitioner, failing to accurately record the appropriate customer record, or some other mistake.¹⁶

One DMV report¹⁷ documented twenty-six actions with respect to a petition over a seven month period, resulting in a denial of an ID because of an inability of the DMV to confirm the petitioner's birth record. Another,¹⁸ twelve contacts over two months, resulting in denial because of a trivial discrepancy between the petitioner's legal name and his birth certificate. This latter individual would have had to go through the courts to legally change his name in order to reconcile the conflicting records. A third,¹⁹ 8 contacts over seven months, resulting in denial because failure of an Illinois state agency to verify birth records.

It is hardly a surprise that in the face of such an arduous and lengthy process, some people will simply give up, and others will not even start the process at all. I conclude that the cancelled and suspended petition requests are equivalent to a denial, since the result is the same – a failure to obtain a qualifying ID. From this, I calculate that 13.5% (143/1,062) of petition requests result in a failure to issue an ID.

IV. Hood's Claims About Provisional Ballots

Hood points to the small number of provisional ballots cast in twenty nine local, primary, or special elections held since Act 23 has been in effect (Hood Report, 38-39). He claims that the fact that a total of only six provisional ballots were cast in these elections is evidence “that almost no one participating in these elections was affected by the implementation of Act 23” (Hood Report, 39).

This statement contains both an inferential error and a crucial qualification.

The inferential error is that these local elections provide no evidence about the effect of Act 23, because they were uniformly low-turnout, low-visibility contests that would bring out

¹⁶ Dkt. No. 113-26.

¹⁷ Dkt. No. 113-7.

¹⁸ Dkt. No. 113-5.

¹⁹ Dkt. No. 113-11.

only the most committed voters (who are the most likely to possess a photo ID, since both turnout and ID possession are correlated with socioeconomic status). Apart from four special legislative (primary and general elections in the 33rd Senate and 99th Assembly districts), the other 25 elections had an average of 1,177 votes, and the highest turnout contests brought out less than 15% of the voters who cast ballots in a November general election.

The qualification is Hood's careful note that his claim that Act 23 does not prevent voters from casting ballots only applies to individuals "*participating in these elections.*" The obvious counterfactual is that voters who lack the necessary ID will simply stay away and not even appear at the polls. Consequently, even a trivial number of provisional ballots does not indicate that Act 23 has no effect on turnout. Hood himself has argued in his published work that the number of provisional ballots is a poor method of assessing the effects of ID laws, because it fails to capture those who do not even try to vote for lack of ID:

Although studying provisional ballots is one method of trying to gauge the effect of photo ID laws, this metric does not capture voter suppression that may be associated with implementation of such a statute. In other words, provisional ballots are only a measure of those registrants who may have shown up to the polls lacking proper photo ID. Those lacking photo ID who may have been deterred from attempting to cast an in-person ballot are not captured by this measure.²⁰

Finally, even if only 6 voters were prevented from casting a ballot in these elections because of Act 23, that number almost certainly exceeds the number of votes in those elections cast fraudulently through voter impersonation that would be prevented by the ID requirement.²¹

V. McCarty's Weighting Method for Recalculating Turnout

Professor Nolan McCarty created a weighting scheme to recalculate aggregate turnout between the 2010 and 2014 gubernatorial elections. His method weights voters and nonvoters in the SVRS in the 2010 election to match the overall turnout rate for that election at the municipal level. This weighting method will, he argues, "provide an accurate measure of the overall turnout rates and turnout rates by race in 2010" (McCarty Report, 10). He also estimates turnout as a percentage of the Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP).

He concludes that these methods show that aggregate turnout increased between 2010 and 2014 for all races and in total.

There are two problems with his approach. First, he concedes that his weighting method works only "as long as roll-off rates are uncorrelated with race at the voting district level" (McCarty Report, 10). If that in fact happens – if minority voters are more likely to fall out of

²⁰ Hood and Bullock, "Much Ado About Nothing," *op cit.*, p. 411.

²¹ The academic literature is virtually unanimous that the rate of vote fraud through impersonation is vanishingly small. See John S. Ahlquist, Kenneth R. Mayer, and Simon Jackman, "Alien Abduction and Voter Impersonation in the 2012 U.S. General Election: Evidence from a Survey List Experiment." *Election Law Journal* 13:460-475 (2014).

the SVRS than white voters – McCarty notes that the result would be an underestimation of “the change in Black turnout between 2010 and 2014, which would work in favor of the plaintiff’s argument” (McCarty Report, 10). The difficulty with his argument is that although this is an empirical question, the effects of a higher roll-off rate for minority voters is identical to a fall-off of turnout among minority voters who remain on the SVRS. If they roll-off, McCarty’s estimates of 2010 turnout are too low, which would understate the drop in minority voting in between 2010 and 2014. If they do not roll off, but simply refrain from voting, we observe the same effect, which is a drop off in turnout from 2010 to 2014. More importantly, it is likely that the voting changes challenged in this litigation *themselves cause a higher roll-off rate for minorities*.

Second, his argument ignores the vital counterfactual, which is what voting would have been absent the changes in voting and registration practices enacted after the 2010 election. It is well known that voting and turnout are affected by a number of campaign and election-specific factors. A complete analysis of the effects of these changes must therefore go beyond a simple comparison of overall turnout from one election to the next. The analysis must consider the specific effects of various changes and what is known about them from the literature.

In short, the fact that overall turnout rose in the aggregate does not serve as confirmation that the changes in election law did not have a depressive effect on specific groups or individuals.

VI. Conclusion

Professor Hood’s report contains significant gaps and errors, both in his incomplete description of the process the Wisconsin DOT used to match records in the SVRS, his misleading comparison of Act 23 to the voter-ID laws in other states, his erroneous reliance on low-turnout elections to study the effect of voter ID, and his mistaken analysis of the petition process for obtaining an ID for voters who do not have the underlying documents.

I conclude that Hood has minimized the stringency of Wisconsin’s voter ID law, vastly understates the difficulty of obtaining an ID through the petition process, and overstates the significance of the relative scarcity of provisional ballots in local or special elections held in Wisconsin in 2015.

When I replicate my analysis of the effect of the voting changes enacted in Wisconsin since 2011 using his smaller population of individuals who lack a driver’s license or state ID, my conclusions are the same: the ID requirement significantly reduces the probability of voting for people who do not have a license or ID.

Moreover, the arguments Hood makes in his report contradict his own research, which has found that voter ID laws reduce turnout and that provisional ballots are not a good measure of the effects of these laws.

Professor McCarty’s weighting methodology, by his own admission, will be inaccurate if the drop off rate for registered voters is higher for some groups rather than others. Because I

find that the roll off rate (which is indistinguishable from a drop off in turnout) is in fact higher for some groups – minorities, students, people who do not possess an ID – his argument about aggregate turnout should not be seen as evidence that changes in voting laws and practices has had no effect.

Table 1 Dependent Variable: Voting in 2014 General Election ²²				
Independent Variable	Model 1: 2010 to 2014	Hood's ID Variable Model 1: 2010 to 2014	Model 2: Recall to 2014	Hood's ID variable Model 2: Recall to 2014
Entered SVRS as of :	2010	2010	Recall	Recall
Voted in 2012	.66	.67	.85	.87
Voted in Recall	.83	.83	.95	.96
Voted in 2010	.64	.64	--	--
Voted in 2008	--	--	--	--
Voted in 2006	--	--	--	--
African American	-.09	-.09	-.13	-.13
Hispanic	-.26	-.26	-.32	-.32
Student Ward	-.24	-.24	-.17	-.15
No ID or License	-.68	-.60	-.66	-.57
Age 25 to 34	.32	.30	.34	.31
Age 35 to 44	.48	.49	.56	.55
Age 45 to 54	.61	.62	.72	.73
Age 55 to 64	.74	.75	.89	.90
Age 65 plus	.74	.75	.96	.96
Constant	-1.43	-1.48	-1.45	-1.48
N	2,714,237	2,714,237	2,965,132	2,965,132
Log Likelihood	-1,165,498	-1,175,277	-1,380,639	-1,392,036
Pseudo r ²	0.22	0.21	0.19	0.18
Pct. Correctly Predicted	81.4%	81.3%	78.8%	78.7%

²² I do not report standard errors or t-values for the models, since all are significant at $p < 0.0001$ or more. The important quantity is the relative size of the coefficients.

Table 2 Marginal Effects on an Individual Registrant's Probability of Voting All Variables Set to Mean Values ²³				
Election	2014	2014	2014	2014
Variable	Model 1 (2010-2014)	Model 1 (2010-2014) Hood's ID Variable	Model 2 (Recall-2014)	Model 2 (Recall-2014) Hood's ID Variable
Black	-2.5%	-2.4%	-4.0%	-3.9%
Hispanic	-7.1%	-7.2%	-9.6%	-9.7%
Student Ward	-6.7%	-6.8%	-4.5%	-4.6%
No ID	-18.8%	-16.9%	-20.0%	-17.4%
Age 65 Plus	20.6%	20.9%	29.0%	29.2%
Voted in 2012	18.3%	18.8%	25.9%	26.3%
Voted in Recall	23.2%	23.3%	28.9%	29.0%
Voted in 2010	18.0%	17.8%	--	--

²³ For each variable in the leftmost column, all of the other variables in the model are set to their mean values. The marginal effect of the control variable is determined by the difference in probability when the value of the variable is changed from 0 to 1. Entries in the table are therefore the independent marginal effect of that variable, controlling for the effects of all other variables.

Appendix A

In the course of preparing this report, I discovered a coding error in my original analysis. This error does not affect any of my substantive conclusions, and has no material effect on the original coefficients and probabilities in Tables 7 and 8 in my original report.

The error was a misclassification of registrant sex among the individuals in the SVRS who did not match onto the DOT data (the unmatched records). Because gender data are found only in the DOT files and not the SVRS, these unmatched records were mistakenly assigned a gender value of "Male." The result was that some of the effect of not possessing an ID was captured by the gender variable. Correcting this involved re-running the original probit regressions by removing the variable "Female," as I am missing this value for some registrants.

As the following updated tables show, making the correction has no overall effect on the variables (the coefficient for not possessing an ID changes from -0.69 to -0.68 in Model 1 and -0.67 to -0.66 in Model 2, with roughly equivalent changes in the control models). The marginal effect of not having an ID on the probability of voting in 2014 (from Table 8) changes from -19.3% to -18.8% in Model 1 and from -20.4% to -20.0% in Model 1. The only nontrivial change was the effect of not having an ID in Control Model C1, where the probability of not voting changed from -5.1% to -3.5%.

This correction had no effect on any of my conclusions.

Updated Table 7 Probit Results					
Dependent Variable: Voting in 2014 General Election			Control Models		
Independent Variable	Model 1: 2010 to 2014 ²⁴	Model 2: Recall to 2014	Control C1: Voting in 2010, Registered since 2006	Control C2: Voting in 2014, Registered since 2006	Control C3: Voting in 2014, Registered <i>between</i> 2010 and Recall
Entered SVRS as of :	2010	Recall	2006	2006	2010-Recall
Voted in 2012	.66	.85	--	.79	.99
Voted in Recall	.83	.95	--	.83	.57
Voted in 2010	.64	--	--	.58	--
Voted in 2008	--	--	.95	.14	--
Voted in 2006	--	--	.88	.39	--
African American	-.09	-.13	.13	-.04	-.18
Hispanic	-.26	-.32	-.24	-.22	-.23
Student Ward	-.24	-.15	.09	-.11	.004
No ID or License	-.68	-.66	-.14	-.66	-.77
Age 25 to 34	.32	.33	.40	-.28	.14
Age 35 to 44	.48	.56	.63	-.10	.25
Age 45 to 54	.61	.72	.77	.02	.31
Age 55 to 64	.74	.89	1.0	.13	.40
Age 65 plus	.74	.96	1.13	.07	.52
Constant	-1.43	-1.45	-1.53	-1.29	-1.38
N	2,714,237	2,965,132	1,990,330	1,990,330	250,895
Log Likelihood	-1,165,498	-1,380,639	-843,357	-725,102	-152,173
Pseudo r ²	0.22	0.19	0.13	0.21	.12
Pct. Correctly Predicted	81.4%	78.8%	82.2%	85.2%	67.1%

²⁴ I do not report standard errors or t-values for the models, since all coefficients but the student ward variable in model C3 (which is not statistically significant) are significant at $p < 0.0001$ or more. The important quantity is the relative size of the coefficients.

Updated Table 8 Marginal Effects on an Individual Registrant's Probability of Voting All Variables Set to Mean Values ²⁵					
Election	2014	2014	2010	2014	2014
Variable	Model 1 (2010-2014)	Model 2 (Recall- 2014)	Control C1: (2006-2010)	Control C2: (2006-2014)	Control C3: Registration between 2010 and Recall
Black	-2.5%	-4.6%	3.2%	-0.8%	-6.7%
Hispanic	-7.1%	-10.1%	-6.1%	-4.8%	-9.2%
Student Ward	-6.7%	-4.6%	2.2%	-2.5%	0.2%
No ID	-18.8%	-20.0%	-3.5%	-14.5%	-30.7%
Age 65 Plus	20.5%	29.1%	28.2%	1.6%	20.8%
Voted in 2012	18.3%	25.8%	--	17.4%	39.6%
Voted in Recall	23.1%	28.9%	--	18.4%	22.7%
Voted in 2010	18.0%	--	--	12.7%	--

²⁵ For each variable in the leftmost column, all of the other variables in the model are set to their mean values. The marginal effect of the control variable is determined by the difference in probability when the value of the variable is changed from 0 to 1. Entries in the table are therefore the independent marginal effect of that variable, controlling for the effects of all other variables.