

foundation in the actual evidence as it has come in during the trial, and (2) should be specifically tailored to the evidence at hand rather than being generalized. *United States v. Kottwitz*, 614 F.3d 1241, *revised on other grounds on rehearing*, 627 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 2010).

The Eleventh Circuit is very clear in this area of law – Coker has the right to have the jury instructed on his theory of defense, separate and apart from instructions given on the elements of the charged offense. *United States v. Opdahl*, 930 F.2D 1530 (11th Cir. 1991). In *Opdahl* the Eleventh Circuit reversed a conviction for the failure to give a theory of defense instruction noting that “[t]he law is clear that the defendant ‘is entitled to have presented instructions relating to a theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence, even though the evidence may be weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility.’” *Id.* at 1535.

In *U.S. v. Ruiz*, 59 F.3d 1151 (11th Cir. 1995) the Eleventh Circuit reversed a conviction and remanded for a new trial. In doing so, the Court concluded that the trial court’s failure to give the requested theory of defense instruction left the jury “without proper guidance for their deliberations”. *Id.* at 1155. In *U.S. v. Edwards*, 968 F.2d 1148 (11th Cir. 1992) the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded another conviction due to the trial court’s failure to give a theory of defense instruction. The Court noted that this was based on longstanding binding precedent from the Fifth Circuit. “As set out by our predecessor court in *United States v. Lewis*, 592 F.2d 1282, 1285 (5th Cir.1979), it has

long been established in this Circuit that it is reversible error to refuse to charge on a defense theory for which there is an evidentiary foundation and which, if believed by the jury, would be legally sufficient to render the accused innocent.” *Id.* at 1153.

In *U.S. v. Arias*, 431 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005) the Court summarized the Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court precedent on this issue when it reversed and remanded another case for a new trial given the trial court’s failure to allow a theory of defense instruction. The Court wrote:

A criminal defendant has the right to a jury instruction on his theory of defense, separate and apart from instructions given on the elements of the charged offense. See *Mathews v. United States*, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988); *United States v. Ruiz*, 59 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir.1995). If the proposed instruction presents a valid defense and there has been “some evidence” adduced at trial to support the defense, a trial court may not refuse to charge the jury on that defense. *Ruiz*, 59 F.3d at 1154. The burden of presenting evidence sufficient to support a jury instruction on a theory of defense is “extremely low.” *Id.* “[T]he defendant is entitled to have presented instructions relating to a theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence, even though the evidence may be weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility.” *United States v. Lively*, 803 F.2d 1124, 1126 (11th Cir.1986) (internal marks omitted). In reviewing the evidence adduced, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the accused. *Ruiz*, 59 F.3d at 1154.

Id. at 1340.

Because Coker is entitled to such an instruction, assuming he meets this “extremely low” threshold and since the instruction is to be specifically and precisely tailored to the evidence presented at trial, Coker requests that he be allowed to present such an instruction at or near the close of all the evidence.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ David McKnight _____

David McKnight

BAXLEY, DILLARD, DAUPHIN

MCKNIGHT & JAMES

2008 Third Avenue South

Birmingham, Alabama 35233

Telephone: 205.271.1100

Fax: 205.271.1108

Email: dmcknight@baxleydillard.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on April 29, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to the following:

Robert D. Segall
Shannon L. Holliday
J. David Martin
Ashley Nicole Penhale
Clayton Rushing Tartt
Copeland, Franco, Screws & Gill, P.A.
P.O. Box 347
Montgomery, AL 36101-0347

Joseph C. Espy, III
Benjamin J. Espy
William M. Espy
Melton, Espy & Williams, P.C.
P.O. Drawer 5130
Montgomery, AL 36103

Fred D. Gray
Walter E. McGowan
Gray, Langford, Sapp, McGowan
Gray, Gray & Nathanson, P.C.
P.O. Box 830239
Tuskegee, AL 36083-0239

Samuel H. Heldman
The Gardner Firm, P.C.
2805 31st Street NW
Washington, DC 20008

Justin Shur
Brenda K. Morris
Emily Rae Woods
Barak Cohen
Eric Olshan
Edward T. Kang
U.S. Department of Justice
1400 New York Ave, NW 12th Floor
Washington, DC 20005

Louis V. Franklin
Stephen P. Feaga
U.S. Attorney's Office
P.O. Box 197
Montgomery, AL 36101

Samuel H. Franklin
Jackson R. Sharman, III
Jeffrey P. Doss
Lightfoot, Franklin & White LLC
400 20th Street North
Birmingham, AL 35203

James P. Judkins
Larry D. Simpson
Judkins, Simpson, High & Schulte
1102 North Gadsden Street
Tallahassee, FL 32303

William N. Clark
Stephen Wesley Shaw
Redden Mills & Clark, LLP
505 North 20th Street, Suite 940
Birmingham, AL 35203

Ron W. Wise
Attorney at Law
200 Interstate Park Drive, Suite 105
Montgomery, AL 36109

H. Lewis Gillis
Tyrone Carlton Means
Thomas Means Gillis & Seay
P.O. Drawer 5058
Montgomery, AL 36103

John Mark Englehart
Englehart Law Offices
9457 Alysbury Place
Montgomery, AL 36117-6005

Thomas M. Goggans
Attorney at Law
2030 East Second Street
Montgomery, AL 36106

J. W. Parkman, III
Joshua Logan McKeown
Richard Martin Adams
William Calvin White, II
Parkman, Adams & White, LLC
505 20th Street North, Suite 825
Birmingham, AL 35203

Susan G. James
Denise A. Simmons
Susan G. James & Associates
600 South McDonough Street
Montgomery, AL 36104

Jeffery C. Duffey
Law Office of Jeffery C. Duffey
600 South McDonough Street
Montgomery, AL 36104

/s/ David McKnight
Of Counsel